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In open systems verification, to formally check for reliability, one needs an appropriate formalism to
model the interaction between agents and express the correctness of the system no matter how the envi-
ronment behaves. An important contribution in this context is given by modal logics for strategic ability,
in the setting of multi-agent games, such as Atl, Atl∗, and the like. Recently, Chatterjee, Henzinger, and
Piterman introduced Strategy Logic, which we denote here by CHP-Sl, with the aim of getting a powerful
framework for reasoning explicitly about strategies. CHP-Sl is obtained by using first-order quantifications
over strategies and has been investigated in the very specific setting of two-agents turned-based games,
where a non-elementary model-checking algorithm has been provided. While CHP-Sl is a very expressive
logic, we claim that it does not fully capture the strategic aspects of multi-agent systems.
In this paper, we introduce and study a more general strategy logic, denoted Sl, for reasoning about
strategies in multi-agent concurrent games. We prove that Sl includes CHP-Sl, while maintaining a decid-
able model-checking problem. In particular, the algorithm we propose is computationally not harder than
the best one known for CHP-Sl. Moreover, we prove that such a problem for Sl is NonElementarySpace-
hard. This negative result has spurred us to investigate here syntactic fragments of Sl, strictly subsuming
Atl∗, with the hope of obtaining an elementary model-checking problem. Among the others, we study the
sublogics Sl[NG], Sl[BG], and Sl[1G]. They encompass formulas in a special prenex normal form having,
respectively, nested temporal goals, Boolean combinations of goals and, a single goal at a time. About these
logics, we prove that the model-checking problem for Sl[1G] is 2ExpTime-complete, thus not harder than
the one for Atl∗. In contrast, Sl[NG] turns out to be NonElementarySpace-hard, strengthening the
corresponding result for Sl. Finally, we observe that Sl[BG] includes CHP-Sl, while its model-checking
problem relies between NonElementaryTime and 2ExpTime.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.3.1 [Logics and Meanings of Programs]: Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning
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1. INTRODUCTION
In system design, model checking is a well-established formal method that allows to automat-
ically check for global system correctness [Clarke and Emerson 1981; Queille and Sifakis 1981;
Clarke et al. 2002]. In such a framework, in order to check whether a system satisfies a re-
quired property, we describe its structure in a mathematical model (such as Kripke struc-
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tures [Kripke 1963] or labeled transition systems [Keller 1976]), specify the property with a
formula of a temporal logic (such as LTL [Pnueli 1977], CTL [Clarke and Emerson 1981], or
CTL∗ [Emerson and Halpern 1986]), and check formally that the model satisfies the formula. In
the last decade, interest has arisen in analyzing the behavior of individual components or sets of
them in systems with several entities. This interest has started in reactive systems, which are sys-
tems that interact continually with their environments. In module checking [Kupferman et al. 2001],
the system is modeled as a module that interacts with its environment and correctness means that a
desired property holds with respect to all such interactions.
Starting from the study of module checking, researchers have looked for logics focus-
ing on the strategic behavior of agents in multi-agent systems [Alur et al. 2002; Pauly 2002;
Jamroga and van der Hoek 2004]. One of the most important development in this field is
Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL∗, for short), introduced by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupfer-
man [Alur et al. 2002]. ATL∗ allows reasoning about strategies of agents with temporal goals. For-
mally, it is obtained as a generalization of CTL∗ in which the path quantifiers, there exists “E” and
for all “A”, are replaced with strategic modalities of the form “〈〈A〉〉” and “[[A]]”, where A is a set
of agents (a.k.a. players). Strategic modalities over agent sets are used to express cooperation and
competition among them in order to achieve certain goals. In particular, these modalities express
selective quantifications over those paths that are the result of infinite games between a coalition
and its complement.
ATL∗ formulas are interpreted over concurrent game structures (CGS, for short) [Alur et al. 2002],
which model interacting processes. Given a CGS G and a set A of agents, the ATL∗ formula 〈〈A〉〉ψ
is satisfied at a state s of G if there is a set of strategies for agents in A such that, no matter strate-
gies are executed by agents not in A, the resulting outcome of the interaction in G satisfies ψ at
s. Thus, ATL∗ can express properties related to the interaction among components, while CTL∗ can
only express property of the global system. As an example, consider the property “processes α and
β cooperate to ensure that a system (having more than two processes) never enters a failure state”.
This can be expressed by the ATL∗ formula 〈〈{α, β}〉〉G ¬fail , where G is the classical LTL tempo-
ral operators “globally”. CTL∗, in contrast, cannot express this property [Alur et al. 2002]. Indeed,
it can only assert whether the set of all agents may or may not prevent the system from entering a
failure state.
The price that one has to pay for the greater expressiveness of ATL∗ is the increased complexity
of model checking. Indeed, both its model-checking and satisfiability problems are 2EXPTIME-
COMPLETE [Alur et al. 2002; Schewe 2008].
Despite its powerful expressiveness, ATL∗ suffers from a strong limitation, due to the fact that
strategies are treated only implicitly, through modalities that refer to games between competing
coalitions. To overcome this problem, Chatterjee, Henzinger, and Piterman introduced Strategy
Logic (CHP-SL, for short) [Chatterjee et al. 2007], a logic that treats strategies in two-player turn-
based games as explicit first-order objects. In CHP-SL, the ATL∗ formula 〈〈{α}〉〉ψ, for a system
modeled by a CGS with agents α and β, becomes ∃x.∀y.ψ(x, y), i.e., “there exists a player-α strat-
egy x such that for all player-β strategies y, the unique infinite path resulting from the two play-
ers following the strategies x and y satisfies the property ψ”. The explicit treatment of strategies
in this logic allows to state many properties not expressible in ATL∗. In particular, it is shown
in [Chatterjee et al. 2007] that ATL∗, in the restricted case of two-agent turn-based games, corre-
sponds to a proper one-alternation fragment of CHP-SL. The authors of that work have also shown
that the model-checking problem for CHP-SL is decidable, although only a non-elementary algo-
rithm for it, both in the size of system and formula, has been provided, leaving as open question
whether an algorithm with a better complexity exists or not. The complementary question about the
decidability of the satisfiability problem for CHP-SL was also left open and, as far as we known, it
is not addressed in other papers apart our preliminary work [Mogavero et al. 2010a].
While the basic idea exploited in [Chatterjee et al. 2007] to quantify over strategies and then
to commit agents explicitly to certain of these strategies turns to be very powerful and use-
ful [Fisman et al. 2010], CHP-SL still presents severe limitations. Among the others, it needs to
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be extended to the more general concurrent multi-agent setting. Also, the specific syntax considered
there allows only a weak kind of strategy commitment. For example, CHP-SL does not allow dif-
ferent players to share the same strategy, suggesting that strategies have yet to become first-class
objects in this logic. Moreover, an agent cannot change his strategy during a play without forcing
the other to do the same.
These considerations, as well as all questions left open about decision problems, led us to intro-
duce and investigate a new Strategy Logic, denoted SL, as a more general framework than CHP-SL,
for explicit reasoning about strategies in multi-agent concurrent games. Syntactically, SL extends
LTL by means of two strategy quantifiers, the existential 〈〈x〉〉 and the universal [[x]], as well as agent
binding (a, x), where a is an agent and x a variable. Intuitively, these elements can be respectively
read as “there exists a strategy x”, “for all strategies x”, and “bind agent a to the strategy asso-
ciated with x”. For example, in a CGS with the three agents α, β, γ, the previous ATL∗ formula
〈〈{α, β}〉〉G ¬fail can be translated in the SL formula 〈〈x〉〉〈〈y〉〉[[z]](α, x)(β, y)(γ, z)(G ¬fail ). The
variables x and y are used to select two strategies for the agentsα and β, respectively, while z is used
to select one for the agent γ such that their composition, after the binding, results in a play where
fail is never met. Note that we can also require, by means of an appropriate choice of agent bindings,
that agents α and β share the same strategy, using the formula 〈〈x〉〉[[z]](α, x)(β, x)(γ, z)(G ¬fail ).
Furthermore, we may vary the structure of the game by changing the way the quantifiers alternate,
as in the formula 〈〈x〉〉[[z]]〈〈y〉〉(α, x)(β, y)(α, z)(G ¬fail ). In this case, x remains uniform w.r.t. z,
but y becomes dependent on it. Finally, we can change the strategy that one agent uses during the
play without changing those of the other agents, by simply using nested bindings, as in the formula
〈〈x〉〉〈〈y〉〉[[z]]〈〈w〉〉(α, x)(β, y)(γ, z)(G (γ,w)G ¬fail ). The last examples intuitively show that SL is
a extension of both ATL∗ and CHP-SL. It is worth noting that the pattern of modal quantifications
over strategies and binding to agents can be extended to other linear-time temporal logics than LTL,
such as the linear µCALCULUS [Vardi 1988]. In fact, the use of LTL here is only a matter of sim-
plicity in presenting our framework, and changing the embedded temporal logic only involves few
side-changes in proofs and decision procedures.
As one of the main results in this paper about SL, we show that the model-checking
problem is non-elementarily decidable. To gain this, we use an automata-theoretic ap-
proach [Kupferman et al. 2000]. Precisely, we reduce the decision problem for our logic to the
emptiness problem of a suitable alternating parity tree automaton, which is an alternating
tree automaton (see [Grädel et al. 2002], for a survey) along with a parity acceptance condi-
tion [Muller and Schupp 1995]. Due to the operations of projection required by the elimination
of quantifications on strategies, which induce at any step an exponential blow-up, the overall size
of the required automaton is non-elementary in the size of the formula, while it is only polyno-
mial in the size of the model. Thus, together with the complexity of the automata-nonemptiness
calculation, we obtain that the model checking problem is in PTIME, w.r.t. the size of the model,
and NONELEMENTARYTIME, w.r.t. the size of the specification. Hence, the algorithm we propose
is computationally not harder than the best one known for CHP-SL and even a non-elementary
improvement with respect to the model. This fact allows for practical applications of SL in the
field of system verification just as those done for the monadic second-order logic on infinite ob-
jects [Elgaard et al. 1998]. Moreover, we prove that our problem has a non-elementary lower bound.
Specifically, it is k-EXPSPACE-HARD in the alternation number k of quantifications in the specifi-
cation.
The contrast between the high complexity of the model-checking problem for our logic and the
elementary one for ATL∗ has spurred us to investigate syntactic fragments of SL, strictly subsuming
ATL∗, with a better complexity. In particular, by means of these sublogics, we would like to under-
stand why SL is computationally more difficult than ATL∗.
The main fragments we study here are Nested-Goal, Boolean-Goal, and One-Goal Strategy Logic,
respectively denoted by SL[NG], SL[BG], and SL[1G]. Note that the last, differently from the first
two, was introduced in [Mogavero et al. 2012]. They encompass formulas in a special prenex nor-
mal form having nested temporal goals, Boolean combinations of goals, and a single goal at a time,
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respectively. For goal we mean an SL formula of the type ♭ψ, where ♭ is a binding prefix of the form
(α1, x1), . . . , (αn, xn) containing all the involved agents and ψ is an agent-full formula. With more
detail, the idea behind SL[NG] is that, when in ψ there is a quantification over a variable, then there
are quantifications of all free variables contained in the inner subformulas. So, a subgoal of ψ that
has a variable quantified in ψ itself cannot use other variables quantified out of this formula. Thus,
goals can be only nested or combined with Boolean and temporal operators. SL[BG] and SL[1G]
further restrict the use of goals. In particular, in SL[1G], each temporal formula ψ is prefixed by
a quantification-binding prefix ℘♭ that quantifies over a tuple of strategies and binds them to all
agents.
As main results about these fragments, we prove that the model-checking problem for SL[1G]
is 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE, thus not harder than the one for ATL∗. On the contrary, for SL[NG], it
is both NONELEMENTARYTIME and NONELEMENTARYSPACE-HARD and thus we enforce the
corresponding result for SL. Finally, we observe that SL[BG] includes CHP-SL, while the relative
model-checking problem relies between 2EXPTIME and NONELEMENTARYTIME.
To achieve all positive results about SL[1G], we use a fundamental property of the semantics of
this logic, called elementariness, which allows us to strongly simplify the reasoning about strategies
by reducing it to a set of reasonings about actions. This intrinsic characteristic of SL[1G], which un-
fortunately is not shared by the other fragments, asserts that, in a determined history of the play, the
value of an existential quantified strategy depends only on the values of strategies, from which the
first depends, on the same history. This means that, to choose an existential strategy, we do not need
to know the entire structure of universal strategies, as for SL, but only their values on the histories
of interest. Technically, to describe this property, we make use of the machinery of dependence map,
which defines a Skolemization procedure for SL, inspired by the one in first order logic.
By means of elementariness, we can modify the SL model-checking procedure via alternating
tree automata in such a way that we avoid the projection operations by using a dedicated automaton
that makes an action quantification for each node of the tree model. Consequently, the resulting
automaton is only exponential in the size of the formula, independently from its alternation num-
ber. Thus, together with the complexity of the automata-nonemptiness calculation, we get that the
model-checking procedure for SL[1G] is 2EXPTIME. Clearly, the elementariness property also holds
for ATL∗, as it is included in SL[1G]. In particular, although it has not been explicitly stated, this
property is crucial for most of the results achieved in literature about ATL∗ by means of automata
(see [Schewe 2008], as an example). Moreover, we believe that our proof techniques are of indepen-
dent interest and applicable to other logics as well.
Related works. Several works have focused on extensions of ATL∗ to incorporate
more powerful strategic constructs. Among them, we recall Alternating-Time µCALCULUS
(AµCALCULUS, for short) [Alur et al. 2002], Game Logic (GL, for short) [Alur et al. 2002],
Quantified Decision Modality µCALCULUS (QDµ, for short) [Pinchinat 2007], Coordination
Logic (CL, for short) [Finkbeiner and Schewe 2010], and some extensions of ATL∗ considered
in [Brihaye et al. 2009]. AµCALCULUS and QDµ are intrinsically different from SL (as well as from
CHP-SL and ATL∗) as they are obtained by extending the propositional µ-calculus [Kozen 1983]
with strategic modalities. CL is similar to QDµ but with LTL temporal operators instead of ex-
plicit fixpoint constructors. GL is strictly included in CHP-SL, in the case of two-player turn-based
games, but it does not use any explicit treatment of strategies, neither it does the extensions of ATL∗
introduced in [Brihaye et al. 2009]. In particular, the latter work consider restrictions on the mem-
ory for strategy quantifiers. Thus, all above logics are different from SL, which we recall it aims
to be a minimal but powerful logic to reason about strategic behavior in multi-agent systems. A
very recent generalization of ATL∗, which results to be expressive but a proper sublogic of SL, is
also proposed in [Costa et al. 2010a]. In this logic, a quantification over strategies does not reset the
strategies previously quantified but allows to maintain them in a particular context in order to be
reused. This makes the logic much more expressive than ATL∗. On the other hand, as it does not al-
low agents to share the same strategy, it is not comparable with the fragments we have considered in
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this paper. Finally, we want to remark that our non-elementary hardness proof about the SL model-
checking problem is inspired by and improves a proof proposed for their logic and communicated
to us [Costa et al. 2010b] by the authors of [Costa et al. 2010a].
Note on [Mogavero et al. 2010a]. Preliminary results on SL appeared in [Mogavero et al. 2010a].
We presented there a 2EXPTIME algorithm for the model-checking problem. The described proce-
dure applies only to the SL[1G] fragment, as model checking for full SL is non-elementary.
Outline. The remaining part of this work is structured as follows. In Section 2, we recall the
semantic framework based on concurrent game structures and introduce syntax and semantics of
SL. Then, in Section 3, we show the non-elementary lower bound for the model-checking problem.
After this, in Section 4, we start the study of few syntactic and semantic SL fragments and introduce
the concepts of dependence map and elementary satisfiability. Finally, in Section 5, we describe
the model-checking automata-theoretic procedures for all SL fragments. Note that, in the accom-
panying Appendix A, we recall standard mathematical notation and some basic definitions that are
used in the paper. However, for the sake of a simpler understanding of the technical part, we make
a reminder, by means of footnotes, for each first use of a non trivial or immediate mathematical
concept. The paper is self contained. All missing proofs in the main body of the work are reported
in appendix.
2. STRATEGY LOGIC
In this section, we introduce Strategy Logic, an extension of the classic linear-time temporal
logic LTL [Pnueli 1977] along with the concepts of strategy quantifications and agent binding.
Our aim is to define a formalism that allows to express strategic plans over temporal goals in
a way that separates the part related to the strategic reasoning from that concerning the tacti-
cal one. This distinctive feature is achieved by decoupling the instantiation of strategies, done
through the quantifications, from their application by means of bindings. Our proposal, on the
line marked by its precursor CHP-SL [Chatterjee et al. 2007; Chatterjee et al. 2010] and differ-
ently from classical temporal logics [Emerson 1990], turns in a logic that is not simply propo-
sitional but predicative, since we treat strategies as a first order concept via the use of agents
and variables as explicit syntactic elements. This fact let us to write Boolean combinations and
nesting of complex predicates, linked together by some common strategic choice, which may
represent each one a different temporal goal. However, it is worth noting that the technical ap-
proach we follow here is quite different from that used for the definition of CHP-SL, which is
based, on the syntactic side, on the CTL∗ formula framework [Emerson and Halpern 1986] and,
on the semantic one, on the two-player turn-based game model [Perrin and Pin 2004].
The section is organized as follows. In Subsection 2.1, we recall the definition of concurrent game
structure used to interpret Strategy Logic, whose syntax is introduced in Subsection 2.2. Then, in
Subsection 2.3, we give, among the others, the notions of strategy and play, which are finally used,
in Subsection 2.4, to define the semantics of the logic.
2.1. Underlying framework
As semantic framework for our logic language, we use a graph-based model for multi-player
games named concurrent game structure [Alur et al. 2002]. Intuitively, this mathematical for-
malism provides a generalization of Kripke structures [Kripke 1963] and labeled transition sys-
tems [Keller 1976], modeling multi-agent systems viewed as games, in which players perform con-
current actions chosen strategically as a function on the history of the play.
Definition 2.1 (Concurrent Game Structures). A concurrent game structure (CGS, for short)
is a tuple G , 〈AP,Ag,Ac, St, λ, τ, s0〉, where AP and Ag are finite non-empty sets of atomic
propositions and agents, Ac and St are enumerable non-empty sets of actions and states, s0 ∈ St
is a designated initial state, and λ : St → 2AP is a labeling function that maps each state to the
set of atomic propositions true in that state. Let Dc , AcAg be the set of decisions, i.e., functions
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from Ag to Ac representing the choices of an action for each agent. 1 Then, τ : St ×Dc → St is a
transition function mapping a pair of a state and a decision to a state.
Observe that elements in St are not global states of the system, but states of the environment in
which the agents operate. Thus, they can be viewed as states of the game, which do not include
the local states of the agents. From a practical point of view, this means that all agents have per-
fect information on the whole game, since local states are not taken into account in the choice of
actions [Fagin et al. 1995]. Observe also that, differently from other similar formalizations, each
agent has the same set of possible executable actions, independently of the current state and of
choices made by other agents. However, as already reported in literature [Pinchinat 2007], this sim-
plifying choice does not result in a limitation of our semantics framework and allow us to give a
simpler and clearer explanation of all formal definitions and techniques we work on.
From now on, apart from the examples and if not differently stated, all CGSs are defined on
the same sets of atomic propositions AP and agents Ag, so, when we introduce a new struc-
ture in our reasonings, we do not make explicit their definition anymore. In addition, we use
the italic letters p, a, c, and s, possibly with indexes, as meta-variables on, respectively, the
atomic propositions p, q, . . . in AP, the agents α, β, γ, . . . in Ag, the actions 0, 1, . . . in Ac,
and the states s, . . . in St. Finally, we use the name of a CGS as a subscript to extract the
components from its tuple-structure. Accordingly, if G = 〈AP,Ag,Ac, St, λ, τ, s0〉, we have
that AcG = Ac, λG = λ, s0G = s0, and so on. Furthermore, we use the same nota-
tional concept to make explicit to which CGS the set Dc of decisions is related to. Note that,
we omit the subscripts if the structure can be unambiguously individuated from the context.
si
∅
sA
wA
sB
wB
DA DB
Di
∗∗ ∗∗
Fig. 1: The CGS GPRS .
Now, to get attitude to the introduced semantic framework, let
us describe two running examples of simple concurrent games. In
particular, we start by modeling the paper, rock, and scissor game.
Example 2.2 (Paper, Rock, and Scissor). Consider the classic
two-player concurrent game paper, rock, and scissor (PRS, for short)
as represented in Figure 1, where a play continues until one of the
participants catches the move of the other. Vertexes are states of the
game and labels on edges represent decisions of agents or sets of
them, where the symbol ∗ is used in place of every possible action. In
this specific case, since there are only two agents, the pair of symbols
∗∗ indicates the whole set Dc of decisions. The agents “Alice” and “Bob” in Ag , {A,B} have
as possible actions those in the set Ac , {P,R, S}, which stand for “paper”, “rock”, and “scissor”,
respectively. During the play, the game can stay in one of the three states in St , {si, sA, sB},
which represent, respectively, the waiting moment, named idle, and the two winner positions.
The latter ones are labeled with one of the atomic propositions in AP , {wA,wB}, in order to
represent who is the winner. The catch of one action over another is described by the relation
C , {(P,R), (R, S), (S,P)} ⊆ Ac×Ac. We can now define the CGS GPRS , 〈AP,Ag,Ac, St, λ,
τ, si〉 for the PRS game, with the labeling given by λ(si) , ∅, λ(sA) , {wA}, and λ(sB) , {wB}
and the transition function set as follows, where DA , {d ∈ DcGPRS : (d(A), d(B)) ∈ C} and
DB , {d ∈ DcGPRS : (d(B), d(A)) ∈ C} are the sets of winning decisions for the two agents: if
s = si and d ∈ DA then τ(s, d) , sA, else if s = si and d ∈ DB then τ(s, d) , sB, otherwise
τ(s, d) , s. Note that, when none of the two agents catches the action of the other, i.e., the used
decision is in Di , DcGPRS \ (DA ∪ DB), the play remains in the idle state to allow another try,
otherwise it is stuck in a winning position forever.
1In the following, we use both X→ Y and YX to denote the set of functions from the domain X to the codomain Y.
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si
fA1 , fA2
sA1
fA1
sj
∅
sA2
fA2
DC
DD
CD
CC
∗∗
∗∗
∗∗
Fig. 2: The CGS GPD.
We now describe a non-classic qualitative version of the well-
known prisoner’s dilemma.
Example 2.3 (Prisoner’s Dilemma). In the prisoner’s dilemma
(PD, for short), two accomplices are interrogated in separated rooms
by the police, which offers them the same agreement. If one defects,
i.e., testifies for the prosecution against the other, while the other co-
operates, i.e., remains silent, the defector goes free and the silent ac-
complice goes to jail. If both cooperate, they remain free, but will
be surely interrogated in the next future waiting for a defection. On
the other hand, if every one defects, both go to jail. It is ensured
that no one will know about the choice made by the other. This
tricky situation can be modeled by the CGS GPD , 〈AP,Ag,Ac, St, λ, τ, si〉 depicted in Figure 2,
where the agents “Accomplice-1” and “Accomplice-2” in Ag , {A1,A2} can chose an action in
Ac , {C,D}, which stand for “cooperation” and “defection”, respectively. There are four states in
St , {si, sA1 , sA2 , sj}. In the idle state si the agents are waiting for the interrogation, while sj rep-
resents the jail for both of them. The remaining states sA1 and sA2 indicate, instead, the situations in
which only one of the agents become definitely free. To characterize the different meaning of these
states, we use the atomic propositions in AP , {fA1 , fA2}, which denote who is “free”, by defining
the following labeling: λ(si) , {fA1 , fA2}, λ(sA1) , {fA1}, λ(sA2) , {fA2}, and λ(sj) , ∅. The
transition function τ can be easily deduced by the figure.
2.2. Syntax
Strategy Logic (SL, for short) syntactically extends LTL by means of two strategy quantifiers, the
existential 〈〈x〉〉 and the universal [[x]], and agent binding (a, x), where a is an agent and x a variable.
Intuitively, these new elements can be respectively read as “there exists a strategy x”, “for all
strategies x”, and “bind agent a to the strategy associated with the variable x”. The formal syntax
of SL follows.
Definition 2.4 (SL Syntax). SL formulas are built inductively from the sets of atomic proposi-
tions AP, variables Var, and agents Ag, by using the following grammar, where p ∈ AP, x ∈ Var,
and a ∈ Ag:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ R ϕ | 〈〈x〉〉ϕ | [[x]]ϕ | (a, x)ϕ.
SL denotes the infinite set of formulas generated by the above rules.
Observe that, by construction, LTL is a proper syntactic fragment of SL, i.e., LTL ⊂ SL. In order to
abbreviate the writing of formulas, we use the boolean values true t and false f and the well-known
temporal operators future F ϕ , tU ϕ and globally G ϕ , fR ϕ. Moreover, we use the italic letters
x, y, z, . . ., possibly with indexes, as meta-variables on the variables x, y, z, . . . in Var.
A first classic notation related to the SL syntax that we need to introduce is that of subformula,
i.e., a syntactic expression that is part of an a priori given formula. By sub : SL → 2SL we formally
denote the function returning the set of subformulas of an SL formula. For instance, consider ϕ =
〈〈x〉〉(α, x)(F p). Then, it is immediate to see that sub(ϕ) = {ϕ, (α, x)(F p), (F p), p, t}.
Normally, predicative logics need the concepts of free and bound placeholders in order to for-
mally define the meaning of their formulas. The placeholders are used to represent particular po-
sitions in syntactic expressions that have to be highlighted, since they have a crucial role in the
definition of the semantics. In first order logic, for instance, there is only one type of placeholders,
which is represented by the variables. In SL, instead, we have both agents and variables as placehold-
ers, as it can be noted by its syntax, in order to distinguish between the quantification of a strategy
and its application by an agent. Consequently, we need a way to differentiate if an agent has an
associated strategy via a variable and if a variable is quantified. To do this, we use the set of free
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agents/variables as the subset of Ag ∪ Var containing (i) all agents for which there is no binding
after the occurrence of a temporal operator and (ii) all variables for which there is a binding but no
quantifications.
Definition 2.5 (SL Free Agents/Variables). The set of free agents/variables of an SL formula is
given by the function free : SL → 2Ag∪Var defined as follows:
(i) free(p) , ∅, where p ∈ AP;
(ii) free(¬ϕ) , free(ϕ);
(iii) free(ϕ1Op ϕ2) , free(ϕ1) ∪ free(ϕ2), where Op ∈ {∧,∨};
(iv) free(X ϕ) , Ag ∪ free(ϕ);
(v) free(ϕ1Op ϕ2) , Ag ∪ free(ϕ1) ∪ free(ϕ2), where Op ∈ {U,R};
(vi) free(Qn ϕ) , free(ϕ) \ {x}, where Qn ∈ {〈〈x〉〉, [[x]] : x ∈ Var};
(vii) free((a, x)ϕ) , free(ϕ), if a 6∈ free(ϕ), where a ∈ Ag and x ∈ Var;
(viii) free((a, x)ϕ) , (free(ϕ) \ {a}) ∪ {x}, if a ∈ free(ϕ), where a ∈ Ag and x ∈ Var.
A formulaϕ without free agents (resp., variables), i.e., with free(ϕ)∩Ag = ∅ (resp., free(ϕ)∩Var =
∅), is named agent-closed (resp., variable-closed). If ϕ is both agent- and variable-closed, it is
referred to as a sentence. The function snt : SL → 2SL returns the set of subsentences snt(ϕ) ,
{φ ∈ sub(ϕ) : free(φ) = ∅} for each SL formula ϕ.
Observe that, on one hand, free agents are introduced in Items iv and v and removed in Item viii.
On the other hand, free variables are introduced in Item viii and removed in Item vi. As an example,
let ϕ = 〈〈x〉〉(α, x)(β, y)(F p) be a formula on the agents Ag = {α, β, γ}. Then, we have free(ϕ) =
{γ, y}, since γ is an agent without any binding after F p and y has no quantification at all. Consider
also the formulas (α, z)ϕ and (γ, z)ϕ, where the subformula ϕ is the same as above. Then, we have
free((α, z)ϕ) = free(ϕ) and free((γ, z)ϕ) = {y, z}, since α is not free in ϕ but γ is, i.e., α /∈ free(ϕ)
and γ ∈ free(ϕ). So, (γ, z)ϕ is agent-closed while (α, z)ϕ is not.
Similarly to the case of first order logic, another important concept that characterizes the syn-
tax of SL is that of the alternation number of quantifiers, i.e., the maximum number of quantifier
switches 〈〈·〉〉[[·]], [[·]]〈〈·〉〉, 〈〈·〉〉¬〈〈·〉〉, or [[·]]¬[[·]] that bind a variable in a subformula that is not a
sentence. The constraint on the kind of subformulas that are considered here means that, when we
evaluate the number of such switches, we consider each possible subsentence as an atomic propo-
sition, hence, its quantifiers are not taken into account. Moreover, it is important to observe that
vacuous quantifications, i.e., quantifications on variable that are not free in the immediate inner
subformula, need to be not considered at all in the counting of quantifier switches. This value is
crucial when we want to analyze the complexity of the decision problems of fragments of our logic,
since higher alternation can usually mean higher complexity. By alt : SL → N we formally de-
note the function returning the alternation number of an SL formula. Furthermore, the fragment
SL[k-alt] , {ϕ ∈ SL : ∀ϕ′ ∈ sub(ϕ) . alt(ϕ′) ≤ k} of SL, for k ∈ N, denotes the subset of
formulas having all subformulas with alternation number bounded by k. For instance, consider the
sentence ϕ = [[x]]〈〈y〉〉(α, x)(β, y)(F ϕ′) with ϕ′ = [[x]]〈〈y〉〉(α, x)(β, y)(X p), on the set of agents
Ag = {α, β}. Then, the alternation number alt(ϕ) is 1 and not 3, as one can think at a first glance,
since ϕ′ is a sentence. Moreover, it holds that alt(ϕ′) = 1. Hence, ϕ ∈ SL[1-alt]. On the other hand,
if we substitute ϕ′ with ϕ′′ = [[x]](α, x)(X p), we have that alt(ϕ) = 2, since ϕ′′ is not a sentence.
Thus, it holds that ϕ 6∈ SL[1-alt] but ϕ ∈ SL[2-alt].
At this point, in order to practice with the syntax of our logic by expressing game-theoretic
concepts through formulas, we describe two examples of important properties that are possible to
write in SL, but neither in ATL∗ [Alur et al. 2002] nor in CHP-SL. This is clarified later in the
paper. The first concept we introduce is the well-known deterministic concurrent multi-player Nash
equilibrium for Boolean valued payoffs.
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Example 2.6 (Nash Equilibrium). Consider the n agents α1, . . . , αn of a game, each of them
having, respectively, a possibly different temporal goal described by one of the LTL formulas
ψ1,. . ., ψn. Then, we can express the existence of a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn) that is a Nash
equilibrium (NE, for short) for α1, . . . , αn w.r.t. ψ1, . . . , ψn by using the SL[1-alt] sentence ϕNE ,
〈〈x1〉〉(α1, x1) · · · 〈〈xn〉〉(αn, xn) ψNE , where ψNE ,
∧n
i=1(〈〈y〉〉(αi, y)ψi) → ψi is a variable-closed
formula. Informally, this asserts that every agent αi has xi as one of the best strategy w.r.t. the goal
ψi, once all the other strategies of the remaining agents αj , with j 6= i, have been fixed to xj . Note
that here we are only considering equilibria under deterministic strategies.
As in physics, also in game theory an equilibrium is not always stable. Indeed, there are games
like the PD of Example 2.3 on page 7 having Nash equilibria that are instable. One of the simplest
concepts of stability that is possible to think is called stability profile.
Example 2.7 (Stability Profile). Think about the same situation of the above example on NE.
Then, a stability profile (SP, for short) is a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn) for α1, . . . , αn w.r.t.
ψ1, . . . , ψn such that there is no agent αi that can choose a different strategy from xi without chang-
ing its own payoff and penalizing the payoff of another agent αj , with j 6= i. To represent the exis-
tence of such a profile, we can use the SL[1-alt] sentence ϕSP , 〈〈x1〉〉(α1, x1) · · · 〈〈xn〉〉(αn, xn)ψSP ,
where ψSP ,
∧n
i,j=1,i6=j ψj → [[y]]((ψi ↔ (αi, y)ψi) → (αi, y)ψj). Informally, with the ψSP
subformula, we assert that, if αj is able to achieve his goal ψj , all strategies y of αi that left
unchanged the payoff related to ψi, also let αj to maintain his achieved goal. At this point, it
is very easy to ensure the existence of an NE that is also an SP, by using the SL[1-alt] sentence
ϕSNE , 〈〈x1〉〉(α1, x1) · · · 〈〈xn〉〉(αn, xn) ψSP ∧ ψNE .
2.3. Basic concepts
Before continuing with the description of our logic, we have to introduce some basic concepts, re-
garding a generic CGS, that are at the base of the semantics formalization. Remind that a description
of used mathematical notation is reported in Appendix A.
We start with the notions of track and path. Intuitively, tracks and paths of a CGS G are legal
sequences of reachable states in G that can be respectively seen as partial and complete descriptions
of possible outcomes of the game modeled by G itself.
Definition 2.8 (Tracks and Paths). A track (resp., path) in a CGS G is a finite (resp., an infinite)
sequence of states ρ ∈ St∗ (resp., π ∈ Stω) such that, for all i ∈ [0, |ρ| − 1[ (resp., i ∈ N),
there exists a decision d ∈ Dc such that (ρ)i+1 = τ((ρ)i, d) (resp., (π)i+1 = τ((π)i, d)). 2 A
track ρ is non-trivial if it has non-zero length, i.e., |ρ| > 0 that is ρ 6= ε. 3 The set Trk ⊆ St+
(resp., Pth ⊆ Stω) contains all non-trivial tracks (resp., paths). Moreover, Trk(s) , {ρ ∈ Trk :
fst(ρ) = s} (resp., Pth(s) , {π ∈ Pth : fst(π) = s}) indicates the subsets of tracks (resp., paths)
starting at a state s ∈ St. 4
For instance, consider the PRS game of Example 2.2 on page 6. Then, ρ = si · sA ∈ St+ and
π = si
ω ∈ Stω are, respectively, a track and a path in the CGS GPRS . Moreover, it holds that
Trk = si
+ + si
∗ · (sA+ + sB+) and Pth = siω + si∗ · (sAω + sBω).
At this point, we can define the concept of strategy. Intuitively, a strategy is a scheme for an agent
that contains all choices of actions as a function of the history of the current outcome. However,
observe that here we do not set an a priori connection between a strategy and an agent, since the
same strategy can be used by more than one agent at the same time.
2The notation (w)i ∈ Σ indicates the element of index i ∈ [0, |w|[ of a non-empty sequence w ∈ Σ∞.
3The Greek letter ε stands for the empty sequence.
4By fst(w) , (w)0 it is denoted the first element of a non-empty sequence w ∈ Σ∞.
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Definition 2.9 (Strategies). A strategy in a CGS G is a partial function f : Trk⇀ Ac that maps
each non-trivial track in its domain to an action. For a state s ∈ St, a strategy f is said s-total if
it is defined on all tracks starting in s, i.e., dom(f) = Trk(s). The set Str , Trk ⇀ Ac (resp.,
Str(s) , Trk(s)→ Ac) contains all (resp., s-total) strategies.
An example of strategy in the CGS GPRS is the function f1 ∈ Str(si) that maps each track having
length multiple of 3 to the action P, the tracks whose remainder of length modulo 3 is 1 to the action
R, and the remaining tracks to the action S. A different strategy is given by the function f2 ∈ Str(si)
that returns the action P, if the tracks ends in sA or sB or if its length is neither a second nor a third
power of a positive number, the action R, if the length is a square power, and the action S, otherwise.
An important operation on strategies is that of translation along a given track, which is used to
determine which part of a strategy has yet to be used in the game.
Definition 2.10 (Strategy Translation). Let f ∈ Str be a strategy and ρ ∈ dom(f) a track in its
domain. Then, (f)ρ ∈ Str denotes the translation of f along ρ, i.e., the strategy with dom((f)ρ) ,
{ρ′ ∈ Trk(lst(ρ)) : ρ · ρ′≥1 ∈ dom(f)} such that (f)ρ(ρ′) , f(ρ · ρ′≥1), for all ρ′ ∈ dom((f)ρ). 5 6
Intuitively, the translation (f)ρ is the update of the strategy f, once the history of the game becomes
ρ. It is important to observe that, if f is a fst(ρ)-total strategy then (f)ρ is lst(ρ)-total. For instance,
consider the two tracks ρ1 = si4 ∈ Trk(si) and ρ2 = si4 · sA2 ∈ Trk(si) in the CGS GPRS and the
strategy f1 ∈ Str(si) previously described. Then, we have that (f1)ρ1 = f1, while (f1)ρ2 ∈ Str(sA)
maps each track having length multiple of 3 to the action S, each track whose remainder of length
modulo 3 is 1 to the action P, and the remaining tracks to the action R.
We now introduce the notion of assignment. Intuitively, an assignment gives a val-
uation of variables with strategies, where the latter are used to determine the behav-
ior of agents in the game. With more detail, as in the case of first order logic,
we use this concept as a technical tool to quantify over strategies associated with
variables, independently of agents to which they are related to. So, assignments are
used precisely as a way to define a correspondence between variables and agents via strategies.
Definition 2.11 (Assignments). An assignment in a CGS G is a partial function χ : Var∪Ag ⇀
Str mapping variables and agents in its domain to a strategy. An assignment χ is complete if it
is defined on all agents, i.e., Ag ⊆ dom(χ). For a state s ∈ St, it is said that χ is s-total if all
strategies χ(l) are s-total, for l ∈ dom(χ). The set Asg , Var ∪ Ag ⇀ Str (resp., Asg(s) ,
Var∪Ag ⇀ Str(s)) contains all (resp., s-total) assignments. Moreover,Asg(X) , X→ Str (resp.,
Asg(X, s) , X→ Str(s)) indicates the subset of X-defined (resp., s-total) assignments, i.e., (resp.,
s-total) assignments defined on the set X ⊆ Var ∪ Ag.
As an example of assignment, let us consider the function χ1 ∈ Asg in the CGS GPRS , defined
on the set {A, x}, whose values are f1 on A and f2 on x, where the strategies f1, f2 ∈ Str(si) are
those described above. Another examples is given by the assignment χ2 ∈ Asg, defined on the set
{A,B}, such that χ2(A) = χ1(x) and χ2(B) = χ1(A). Note that both are si-total and the latter is
also complete while the former is not.
As in the case of strategies, it is useful to define the operation of translation along a given track
for assignments too.
Definition 2.12 (Assignment Translation). For a given state s ∈ St, let χ ∈ Asg(s) be an s-
total assignment and ρ ∈ Trk(s) a track. Then, (χ)ρ ∈ Asg(lst(ρ)) denotes the translation of χ
along ρ, i.e., the lst(ρ)-total assignment, with dom((χ)ρ) , dom(χ), such that (χ)ρ(l) , (χ(l))ρ,
for all l ∈ dom(χ).
5By lst(w) , (w)|w|−1 it is denoted the last element of a finite non-empty sequence w ∈ Σ∗.
6The notation (w)≥i ∈ Σ∞ indicates the suffix from index i ∈ [0, |w|] inwards of a non-empty sequence w ∈ Σ∞.
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Intuitively, the translation (χ)ρ is the simultaneous update of all strategies χ(l) defined by the as-
signment χ, once the history of the game becomes ρ.
Given an assignment χ, an agent or variable l, and a strategy f, it is important to define a notation
to represent the redefinition of χ, i.e., a new assignment equal to the first on all elements of its
domain but l, on which it assumes the value f.
Definition 2.13 (Assignment Redefinition). Let χ ∈ Asg be an assignment, f ∈ Str a strategy
and l ∈ Var ∪ Ag either an agent or a variable. Then, χ[l 7→ f] ∈ Asg denotes the new assignment
defined on dom(χ[l 7→ f]) , dom(χ) ∪ {l} that returns f on l and is equal to χ on the remaining
part of its domain, i.e., χ[l 7→ f](l) , f and χ[l 7→ f](l′) , χ(l′), for all l′ ∈ dom(χ) \ {l}.
Intuitively, if we have to add or update a strategy that needs to be bound by an agent or variable,
we can simply take the old assignment and redefine it by using the above notation. It is worth to
observe that, if χ and f are s-total then χ[l 7→ f] is s-total too.
Now, we can introduce the concept of play in a game. Intuitively, a play is the unique outcome of
the game determined by all agent strategies participating to it.
Definition 2.14 (Plays). A path π ∈ Pth(s) starting at a state s ∈ St is a play w.r.t. a complete
s-total assignment χ ∈ Asg(s) ((χ, s)-play, for short) if, for all i ∈ N, it holds that (π)i+1 =
τ((π)i, d), where d(a) , χ(a)((π)≤i), for each a ∈ Ag. 7 The partial function play : Asg × St ⇀
Pth, with dom(play) , {(χ, s) : Ag ⊆ dom(χ) ∧ χ ∈ Asg(s) ∧ s ∈ St}, returns the (χ, s)-play
play(χ, s) ∈ Pth(s), for all pairs (χ, s) in its domain.
As a last example, consider again the complete si-total assignment χ2 previously described for the
CGS GPRS , which returns the strategies f2 and f1 on the agents A and B, respectively. Then, we have
that play(χ2, si) = si3 · sBω. This means that the play is won by the agent B.
Finally, we give the definition of global translation of a complete assignment together with a
related state, which is used to calculate, at a certain step of the play, what is the current state and its
updated assignment.
Definition 2.15 (Global Translation). For a given state s ∈ St and a complete s-total assign-
ment χ ∈ Asg(s), the i-th global translation of (χ, s), with i ∈ N, is the pair of a complete
assignment and a state (χ, s)i , ((χ)(π)≤i , (π)i), where π = play(χ, s).
In order to avoid any ambiguity of interpretation of the described notions, we may use the name
of a CGS as a subscript of the sets and functions just introduced to clarify to which structure they
are related to, as in the case of components in the tuple-structure of the CGS itself.
2.4. Semantics
As already reported at the beginning of this section, just like ATL∗ and differently from CHP-SL,
the semantics of SL is defined w.r.t. concurrent game structures. For a CGS G, one of its states s, and
an s-total assignment χ with free(ϕ) ⊆ dom(χ), we write G, χ, s |= ϕ to indicate that the formula
ϕ holds at s in G under χ. The semantics of SL formulas involving the atomic propositions, the
Boolean connectives ¬, ∧, and ∨, as well as the temporal operators X, U, and R is defined as usual
in LTL. The novel part resides in the formalization of the meaning of strategy quantifications 〈〈x〉〉
and [[x]] and agent binding (a, x).
Definition 2.16 (SL Semantics). Given a CGS G, for all SL formulas ϕ, states s ∈ St, and
s-total assignments χ ∈ Asg(s) with free(ϕ) ⊆ dom(χ), the modeling relation G, χ, s |= ϕ is
inductively defined as follows.
(1) G, χ, s |= p if p ∈ λ(s), with p ∈ AP.
(2) For all formulas ϕ, ϕ1, and ϕ2, it holds that:
7The notation (w)≤i ∈ Σ∗ indicates the prefix up to index i ∈ [0, |w|] of a non-empty sequence w ∈ Σ∞.
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(a) G, χ, s |= ¬ϕ if not G, χ, s |= ϕ, that is G, χ, s 6|= ϕ;
(b) G, χ, s |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if G, χ, s |= ϕ1 and G, χ, s |= ϕ2;
(c) G, χ, s |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 if G, χ, s |= ϕ1 or G, χ, s |= ϕ2.
(3) For a variable x ∈ Var and a formula ϕ, it holds that:
(a) G, χ, s |= 〈〈x〉〉ϕ if there exists an s-total strategy f ∈ Str(s) such that G, χ[x 7→ f], s |= ϕ;
(b) G, χ, s |= [[x]]ϕ if for all s-total strategies f ∈ Str(s) it holds that G, χ[x 7→ f], s |= ϕ.
(4) For an agent a ∈ Ag, a variable x ∈ Var, and a formula ϕ, it holds that G, χ, s |= (a, x)ϕ if
G, χ[a 7→ χ(x)], s |= ϕ.
(5) Finally, if the assignment χ is also complete, for all formulas ϕ, ϕ1, and ϕ2, it holds that:
(a) G, χ, s |= X ϕ if G, (χ, s)1 |= ϕ;
(b) G, χ, s |= ϕ1U ϕ2 if there is an index i ∈ N with k ≤ i such that G, (χ, s)i |= ϕ2 and, for
all indexes j ∈ N with k ≤ j < i, it holds that G, (χ, s)j |= ϕ1;
(c) G, χ, s |= ϕ1R ϕ2 if, for all indexes i ∈ N with k ≤ i, it holds that G, (χ, s)i |= ϕ2 or there
is an index j ∈ N with k ≤ j < i such that G, (χ, s)j |= ϕ1.
Intuitively, at Items 3a and 3b, respectively, we evaluate the existential 〈〈x〉〉 and universal [[x]] quan-
tifiers over strategies, by associating them to the variable x. Moreover, at Item 4, by means of an
agent binding (a, x), we commit the agent a to a strategy associated with the variable x. It is evident
that, due to Items 5a, 5b, and 5c, the LTL semantics is simply embedded into the SL one.
In order to complete the description of the semantics, we now give the classic notions of model
and satisfiability of an SL sentence.
Definition 2.17 (SL Satisfiability). We say that a CGS G is a model of an SL sentence ϕ, in
symbols G |= ϕ, if G,∅, s0 |= ϕ. 8 In general, we also say that G is a model for ϕ on s ∈ St, in
symbols G, s |= ϕ, if G,∅, s |= ϕ. An SL sentence ϕ is satisfiable if there is a model for it.
It remains to introduce the concepts of implication and equivalence between SL formulas, which
are useful to describe transformations preserving the meaning of a specification.
Definition 2.18 (SL Implication and Equivalence). Given two SL formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2 with
free(ϕ1) = free(ϕ2), we say that ϕ1 implies ϕ2, in symbols ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2, if, for all CGSs G, states
s ∈ St, and free(ϕ1)-defined s-total assignments χ ∈ Asg(free(ϕ1), s), it holds that if G, χ, s |= ϕ1
then G, χ, s |= ϕ2. Accordingly, we say that ϕ1 is equivalent to ϕ2, in symbols ϕ1 ≡ ϕ2, if both
ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 and ϕ2 ⇒ ϕ1 hold.
In the rest of the paper, especially when we describe a decision procedure, we may consider
formulas in existential normal form (enf, for short) and positive normal form (pnf, for short), i.e.,
formulas in which only existential quantifiers appear or in which the negation is applied only to
atomic propositions. In fact, it is to this aim that we have considered in the syntax of SL both the
Boolean connectives ∧ and ∨, the temporal operators U, and R, and the strategy quantifiers 〈〈·〉〉 and
[[·]]. Indeed, all formulas can be linearly translated in pnf by using De Morgan’s laws together with
the following equivalences, which directly follow from the semantics of the logic: ¬X ϕ ≡ X ¬ϕ,
¬(ϕ1U ϕ2) ≡ (¬ϕ1)R (¬ϕ2), ¬〈〈x〉〉ϕ ≡ [[x]]¬ϕ, and ¬(a, x)ϕ ≡ (a, x)¬ϕ.
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Fig. 3: The CGS GSV .
At this point, in order to better understand the meaning of our
logic, we discuss two examples in which we describe the evaluation
of the semantics of some formula w.r.t. the a priori given CGSs. We
start by explaining how a strategy can be shared by different agents.
Example 2.19 (Shared Variable). Consider the SL[2-alt] sen-
tence ϕ = 〈〈x〉〉[[y]]〈〈z〉〉((α, x)(β, y)(X p) ∧ (α, y)(β, z)(X q)). It
is immediate to note that both agents α and β use the strategy asso-
ciated with y to achieve simultaneously the LTL temporal goals X p
8The symbol ∅ stands for the empty function.
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andX q. A model forϕ is given by the CGS GSV , 〈{p, q}, {α, β},
{0, 1}, {s0, s1, s2, s3}, λ, τ, s0〉, where λ(s0) , ∅, λ(s1) , {p}, λ(s2) , {p, q}, λ(s3) , {q},
τ(s0, (0, 0)) , s1, τ(s0, (0, 1)) , s2, τ(s0, (1, 0)) , s3, and all the remaining transitions (with any
decision) go to s0. In Figure 3 on the facing page, we report a graphical representation of the struc-
ture. Clearly, GSV |= ϕ by letting, on s0, the variables x to chose action 0 (the goal (α, x)(β, y)(X p)
is satisfied for any choice of y, since we can move from s0 to either s1 or s2, both labeled with p)
and z to choose action 1 when y has action 0 and, vice versa, 0 when y has 1 (in both cases, the goal
(α, y)(β, z)(X q) is satisfied, since one can move from s0 to either s2 or s3, both labeled with q).
We now discuss an application of the concepts of Nash equilibrium and stability profile to both
the prisoner’s dilemma and the paper, rock, and scissor game.
Example 2.20 (Equilibrium Profiles). Let us first to consider the CGS GPD of the prisoner’s
dilemma described in the Example 2.3 on page 7. Intuitively, each of the two accomplices A1 and
A2 want to avoid the prison. These goals can be, respectively, represented by the LTL formulas
ψA1 , G fA1 and ψA2 , G fA2 . The existence of a Nash equilibrium in GPD for the two accomplices
w.r.t. the above goals can be written as φNE , 〈〈x1〉〉(A1, x1)〈〈x2〉〉(A2, x2) ψNE , where ψNE ,
((〈〈y〉〉(A1, y)ψA1 )→ ψA1) ∧ ((〈〈y〉〉(A2, y)ψA2)→ ψA2), which results to be an instantiation of the
general sentence ϕNE of Example 2.6 on page 9. In the same way, the existence of a stable Nash
equilibrium can be represented with the sentence φSNE , 〈〈x1〉〉(A1, x1)〈〈x2〉〉(A2, x2) ψNE ∧ ψSP ,
where ψSP , (ψ1 → [[y]]((ψ2 ↔ (A2, y)ψ2) → (A2, y)ψ1)) ∧ (ψ2 → [[y]]((ψ1 ↔ (A1, y)ψ1) →
(A1, y)ψ2)), which is a particular case of the sentence ϕSNE of Example 2.7 on page 9. Now, it is
easy to see that GPD |= φSNE and, so, GPD |= φNE . Indeed, an assignment χ ∈ AsgGPD (Ag, si), for
which χ(A1)(si) = χ(A2)(si) = D, is a stable equilibrium profile, i.e., it is such that GPD, χ, si |=
ψNE ∧ ψSP . This is due to the fact that, if an agent Ak, for k ∈ {1, 2}, choses another strategy
f ∈ StrGPD (si), he is still unable to achieve his goalψk, i.e., GPD, χ[Ak 7→ f], si 6|= ψk, so, he cannot
improve his payoff. Moreover, this equilibrium is stable, since the payoff of an agent cannot be made
worse by the changing of the strategy of the other agent. However, it is interesting to note that there
are instable equilibria too. One of these is represented by the assignment χ′ ∈ AsgGPD (Ag, si), for
which χ′(A1)(sij) = χ′(A2)(sij) = C, for all j ∈ N. Indeed, we have that GPD, χ′, si |= ψNE , since
GPD, χ′, si |= ψ1 and GPD, χ′, si |= ψ2, but GPD, χ′, si 6|= ψSP . The latter property holds because,
if one of the agents Ak, for k ∈ {1, 2}, choses a different strategy f′ ∈ StrGPD (si) for which there
is a j ∈ N such that f′(sij) = D, he cannot improve his payoff but makes surely worse the payoff of
the other agent, i.e., GPD, χ′[Ak 7→ f′], si |= ψk but GPD, χ′[Ak 7→ f′], si 6|= ψ3−k. Finally, consider
the CGS GPRS of the paper, rock, and scissor game described in the Example 2.2 on page 6 together
with the associated formula for the Nash equilibrium φNE , 〈〈x1〉〉(A, x1)〈〈x2〉〉(B, x2) ψNE , where
ψNE , ((〈〈y〉〉(A, y)ψA) → ψA) ∧ ((〈〈y〉〉(B, y)ψB) → ψB) with ψA , F wA and ψB , F wB
representing the LTL temporal goals for Alice and Bob, respectively. Then, it is not hard to see that
GPRS 6|= φNE , i.e., there are no Nash equilibria in this game, since there is necessarily an agent that
can improve his/her payoff by changing his/her strategy.
Finally, we want to remark that our semantics framework, based on concurrent game structures,
is enough expressive to describe turn-based features in the multi-agent case too. This is possible by
simply allowing the transition function to depend only on the choice of actions of an a priori given
agent for each state.
Definition 2.21 (Turn-Based Game Structures). A CGS G is turn-based if there exists a func-
tion η : St→ Ag, named owner function, such that, for all states s ∈ St and decisions d1, d2 ∈ Dc,
it holds that if d1(η(s)) = d2(η(s)) then τ(s, d1) = τ(s, d2).
Intuitively, a CGS is turn-based if it is possible to associate with each state an agent, i.e., the owner
of the state, which is responsible for the choice of the successor of that state. It is immediate to
observe that η introduces a partitioning of the set of states into |rng(η)| components, each one ruled
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by a single agent. Moreover, observe that a CGS having just one agent is trivially turn-based, since
this agent is the only possible owner of all states.
In the following, as one can expect, we also consider the case in which SL has its semantics
defined on turn-based CGS only. In such an eventuality, we name the resulting semantic fragment
Turn-based Strategy Logic (TB-SL, for short) and refer to the related satisfiability concept as turn-
based satisfiability.
3. MODEL-CHECKING HARDNESS
In this section, we show the non-elementary lower bound for the model-checking problem of SL.
Precisely, we prove that, for sentences having alternation number k, this problem is k-EXPSPACE-
HARD. To this aim, in Subsection 3.1, we first recall syntax and semantics of QPTL [Sistla 1983].
Then, in Subsection 3.2, we give a reduction from the satisfiability problem for this logic to the
model-checking problem for SL.
3.1. Quantified propositional temporal logic
Quantified Propositional Temporal Logic (QPTL, for short) syntactically extends the old-style tem-
poral logic with the future F and global G operators by means of two proposition quantifiers, the
existential ∃q. and the universal ∀q., where q is an atomic proposition. Intuitively, these elements
can be respectively read as “there exists an evaluation of q” and “for all evaluations of q”. The
formal syntax of QPTL follows.
Definition 3.1 (QPTL Syntax). QPTL formulas are built inductively from the sets of atomic
propositions AP, by using the following grammar, where p ∈ AP:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | F ϕ | G ϕ | ∃p.ϕ | ∀p.ϕ.
QPTL denotes the infinite set of formulas generated by the above grammar.
Similarly to SL, we use the concepts of subformula, free atomic proposition, sentence, and alter-
nation number, together with the QPTL syntactic fragment of bounded alternation QPTL[k-alt], with
k ∈ N.
In order to define the semantics of QPTL, we have first to introduce the concepts of truth evalua-
tions used to interpret the meaning of atomic propositions at the passing of time.
Definition 3.2 (Truth Evaluations). A temporal truth evaluation is a function tte : N → {f, t}
that maps each natural number to a Boolean value. Moreover, a propositional truth evaluation is a
partial function pte : AP ⇀ TTE mapping every atomic proposition in its domain to a temporal
truth evaluation. The sets TTE , N → {f, t} and PTE , AP ⇀ TTE contain, respectively, all
temporal and propositional truth evaluations.
At this point, we have the tool to define the interpretation of QPTL formulas. For a propositional
truth evaluation pte with free(ϕ) ⊆ dom(pte) and a number k, we write pte, k |= ϕ to indicate that
the formula ϕ holds at the k-th position of the pte.
Definition 3.3 (QPTL Semantics). For all QPTL formulas ϕ, propositional truth evaluation
pte ∈ PTE with free(ϕ) ⊆ dom(pte), and numbers k ∈ N, the modeling relation pte, k |= ϕ
is inductively defined as follows.
(1) pte, k |= p iff pte(p)(k) = t, with p ∈ AP.
(2) For all formulas ϕ, ϕ1, and ϕ2, it holds that:
(a) pte, k |= ¬ϕ iff not pte, k |= ϕ, that is pte, k 6|= ϕ;
(b) pte, k |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff pte, k |= ϕ1 and pte, k |= ϕ2;
(c) pte, k |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff pte, k |= ϕ1 or pte, k |= ϕ2;
(d) pte, k |= X ϕ iff pte, k + 1 |= ϕ;
(e) pte, k |= F ϕ iff there is an index i ∈ N with k ≤ i such that pte, i |= ϕ;
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(f) pte, k |= G ϕ iff, for all indexes i ∈ N with k ≤ i, it holds that pte, i |= ϕ.
(3) For an atomic proposition q ∈ AP and a formula ϕ, it holds that:
(a) pte, k |= ∃q.ϕ iff there exists a temporal truth evaluation tte ∈ TTE such that pte[q 7→
tte], k |= ϕ;
(b) pte, k |= ∀q.ϕ iff for all temporal truth evaluations tte ∈ TTE it holds that pte[q 7→
tte], k |= ϕ.
Obviously, a QPTL sentence ϕ is satisfiable if ∅, 0 |= ϕ. Observe that the described semantics is
slightly different but completely equivalent to that proposed and used in [Sistla et al. 1987] to prove
the non-elementary hardness result for the satisfiability problem.
3.2. Non-elementary lower-bound
We can show how the solution of QPTL satisfiability problem can be reduced to that of the model-
checking problem for SL, over a turn-based constant size CGS with a unique atomic proposition.
s0
∅
s1
p
t
f
f
t
Fig. 4: The CGS GRdc.
In order to do this, we first prove the following auxiliary lemma,
which actually represents the main step of the above mentioned reduc-
tion.
LEMMA 3.4 (QPTL REDUCTION). There is a one-agent CGS GRdc
such that, for each QPTL[k-alt] sentence ϕ, with k ∈ N, there exists
an TB-SL[k-alt] variable-closed formula ϕ such that ϕ is satisfiable iff GRdc, χ, s0 |= ϕ, for all
complete assignments χ ∈ Asg(Ag, s0).
PROOF. Consider the one-agent CGS GRdc , 〈{p}, {α}, {f, t}, {s0, s1}, λ, τ, s0〉 depicted in
Figure 4, where the two actions are the Boolean values false and true and where the labeling and
transition functions λ and τ are set as follows: λ(s0) , ∅, λ(s1) , {p}, and τ(s, d) = s0 iff
d(α) = f, for all s ∈ St and d ∈ Dc. It is evident that GRdc is a turn-based CGS. Moreover, consider
the transformation function · : QPTL → SL inductively defined as follows:
— q , (α, xq)X p, for q ∈ AP;
— ∃q.ϕ , 〈〈xq〉〉ϕ;
— ∀q.ϕ , [[xq]]ϕ;
— Op ϕ , Op ϕ, where Op ∈ {¬,X,F,G};
—ϕ1Op ϕ2 , ϕ1Op ϕ2 , where Op ∈ {∧,∨}.
It is not hard to see that a QPTL formula ϕ is a sentence iff ϕ is variable-closed. Furthermore, we
have that alt(ϕ) = alt(ϕ).
At this point, it remains to prove that, a QPTL sentence ϕ is satisfiable iff GRdc, χ, s0 |= ϕ, for
all total assignments χ ∈ Asg({α}, s0). To do this by induction on the structure of ϕ, we actually
show a stronger result asserting that, for all subformulasψ ∈ sub(ϕ), propositional truth evaluations
pte ∈ PTE, and i ∈ N, it holds that pte, i |= ψ iff GRdc, (χ, s0)i |= ψ , for each total assignment
χ ∈ Asg({α} ∪ {xq ∈ Var : q ∈ free(ψ)}, s0) such that χ(xq)((π)≤n) = pte(q)(n), where
π , play(χ, s0), for all q ∈ free(ψ) and n ∈ [i, ω[ .
Here, we only show the base case of atomic propositions and the two inductive cases regarding
the proposition quantifiers. The remaining cases of Boolean connectives and temporal operators are
straightforward and left to the reader as a simple exercise.
—ψ = q.
By Item 1 of Definition 3.3 of QPTL semantics, we have that pte, i |= q iff pte(q)(i) = t. Thus,
due to the above constraint on the assignment, it follows that pte, i |= q iff χ(xq)((π)≤i) = t. Now,
by applying Items 4 and 5a of Definition 2.16 of SL semantics, we have that GRdc, (χ, s0)i |=
(α, xq)X p iff GRdc, (χ′[α 7→ χ′(xq)], s′)1 |= p, where (χ′, s′) = (χ, s0)i. At this point, due to the
particular structure of the CGS GRdc, we have that GRdc, (χ′[α 7→ χ′(xq)], s′)1 |= p iff (π′)1 = s1,
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where π′ , play(χ′[α 7→ χ′(xq)], s′), which in turn is equivalent to χ′(xq)((π′)≤0) = t. So,
GRdc, (χ, s0)i |= (α, xq)X p iff χ′(xq)((π′)≤0) = t. Now, by observing that (π′)≤0 = (π)i and
using the above definition ofχ′, we obtain that χ′(xq)((π′)≤0) = χ(xq)((π)≤i). Hence, pte, i |= q
iff pte(q)(i) = χ(xq)((π)≤i) = t = χ′(xq)((π′)≤0) iff GRdc, (χ, s0)i |= (α, xq)X p.
— ψ = ∃q.ψ′.
[Only if]. If pte, i |= ∃q.ψ′, by Item 3a of Definition 3.3, there exists a temporal truth evaluation
tte ∈ TTE such that pte[q 7→ tte], i |= ψ′. Now, consider a strategy f ∈ Str(s0) such that
f((π)≤n) = tte(n), for all n ∈ [i, ω[ . Then, it is evident that χ[xq 7→ f](xq′ )((π)≤n) = pte[q 7→
tte](q′)(n), for all q′ ∈ free(ψ) and n ∈ [i, ω[ . So, by the inductive hypothesis, it follows that
GRdc, (χ[xq 7→ f], s0)i |= ψ′ . Thus, we have that GRdc, (χ, s0)i |= 〈〈xq〉〉ψ′ .
[If]. If GRdc, (χ, s0)i |= 〈〈xq〉〉ψ′ , there exists a strategy f ∈ Str(s0) such that GRdc, (χ[xq 7→
f], s0)
i |= ψ′ . Now, consider a temporal truth evaluation tte ∈ TTE such that tte(n) = f((π)≤n),
for all n ∈ [i, ω[ . Then, it is evident that χ[xq 7→ f](xq′ )((π)≤n) = pte[q 7→ tte](q′)(n), for all
q′ ∈ free(ψ) and n ∈ [i, ω[ . So, by the inductive hypothesis, it follows that pte[q 7→ tte], i |= ψ′.
Thus, by Item 3a of Definition 3.3, we have that pte, i |= ∃q.ψ′.
— ψ = ∀q.ψ′.
[Only if]. For each strategy f ∈ Str(s0), consider a temporal truth evaluation tte ∈ TTE
such that tte(n) = f((π)≤n), for all n ∈ [i, ω[ . It is evident that χ[xq 7→ f](xq′)((π)≤n) =
pte[q 7→ tte](q′)(n), for all q′ ∈ free(ψ) and n ∈ [i, ω[ . Now, since pte, i |= ∀q.ψ′, by
Item 3b of Definition 3.3, it follows that pte[q 7→ tte], i |= ψ′. So, by the inductive hypothe-
sis, for each strategy f ∈ Str(s0), it holds that GRdc, (χ[xq 7→ f], s0)i |= ψ′ . Thus, we have that
GRdc, (χ, s0)i |= [[xq]]ψ′ .
[If]. For each temporal truth evaluation tte ∈ TTE, consider a strategy f ∈ Str(s0) such
that f((π)≤n) = tte(n), for all n ∈ [i, ω[ . It is evident that χ[xq 7→ f](xq′ )((π)≤n) = pte[q 7→
tte](q′)(n), for all q′ ∈ free(ψ) and n ∈ [i, ω[ . Now, since GRdc, (χ, s0)i |= [[xq]]ψ′ , it follows that
GRdc, (χ[xq 7→ f], s0)i |= ψ′ . So, by the inductive hypothesis, for each temporal truth evaluation
tte ∈ TTE, it holds that pte[q 7→ tte], i |= ψ′. Thus, by Item 3b of Definition 3.3, we have that
pte, i |= ∀q.ψ′.
Thus, we are done with the proof.
Now, we can show the full reduction that allows us to state the existence of a non-elementary
lower-bound for the model-checking problem of TB-SL and, thus, of SL.
THEOREM 3.5 (TB-SL MODEL-CHECKING HARDNESS). The model-checking problem for
TB-SL[k-alt] is k-EXPSPACE-HARD.
PROOF. Let ϕ be a QPTL[k-alt] sentence, ϕ the related TB-SL[k-alt] variable-closed formula,
and GRdc the turn-based CGS of Lemma 3.4 of QPTL reduction. Then, by applying the previous men-
tioned lemma, it is easy to see that ϕ is satisfiable iff GRdc |= [[x]](α, x)ϕ iff GRdc |= 〈〈x〉〉(α, x)ϕ.
Thus, the satisfiability problem for QPTL can be reduced to the model-checking problem for TB-SL.
Now, since the satisfiability problem for QPTL[k-alt] is k-EXPSPACE-HARD [Sistla et al. 1987], we
have that the model-checking problem for TB-SL[k-alt] is k-EXPSPACE-HARD as well.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous theorem.
COROLLARY 3.6 (SL MODEL-CHECKING HARDNESS). The model-checking problem for
SL[k-alt] is k-EXPSPACE-HARD.
4. STRATEGY QUANTIFICATIONS
Since model checking for SL is non-elementary hard while the same problem for ATL∗ is only
2EXPTIME-COMPLETE, a question that naturally arises is whether there are proper fragments of
SL of practical interest, still strictly subsuming ATL∗, that reside in such a complexity gap. In this
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section, we answer positively to this question and go even further. Precisely, we enlighten a funda-
mental property that, if satisfied, allows to retain a 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE model-checking problem.
We refer to such a property as elementariness. To formally introduce this concept, we use the notion
of dependence map as a machinery.
The remaining part of this section is organized as follows. In Subsection 4.1, we describe three
syntactic fragments of SL, named SL[NG], SL[BG], and SL[1G], having the peculiarity to use strategy
quantifications grouped in atomic blocks. Then, in Subsection 4.2, we define the notion of depen-
dence map, which is used, in Subsection 4.3, to introduce the concept of elementariness. Finally,
in Subsection 4.4, we prove a fundamental result, which is at the base of our elementary model-
checking procedure for SL[1G].
4.1. Syntactic fragments
In order to formalize the syntactic fragments of SL we want to investigate, we first need to define
the concepts of quantification and binding prefixes.
Definition 4.1 (Prefixes). A quantification prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables is a finite
word ℘ ∈ {〈〈x〉〉, [[x]] : x ∈ V}|V| of length |V| such that each variable x ∈ V occurs just once in
℘, i.e., there is exactly one index i ∈ [0, |V|[ such that (℘)i ∈ {〈〈x〉〉, [[x]]}. A binding prefix over
a set of variables V ⊆ Var is a finite word ♭ ∈ {(a, x) : a ∈ Ag ∧ x ∈ V}|Ag| of length |Ag|
such that each agent a ∈ Ag occurs just once in ♭, i.e., there is exactly one index i ∈ [0, |Ag|[ for
which (♭)i ∈ {(a, x) : x ∈ V}. Finally, Qnt(V) ⊆ {〈〈x〉〉, [[x]] : x ∈ V}|V| and Bnd(V) ⊆ {(a, x)
: a ∈ Ag ∧ x ∈ V}|Ag| denote, respectively, the sets of all quantification and binding prefixes over
variables in V.
We now have all tools to define the syntactic fragments we want to analyze, which we name, re-
spectively, Nested-Goal, Boolean-Goal, and One-Goal Strategy Logic (SL[NG], SL[BG], and SL[1G],
for short). For goal we mean an SL agent-closed formula of the kind ♭ϕ, with Ag ⊆ free(ϕ), being
♭ ∈ Bnd(Var) a binding prefix. The idea behind SL[NG] is that, when there is a quantification over a
variable used in a goal, we are forced to quantify over all free variables of the inner subformula con-
taining the goal itself, by using a quantification prefix. In this way, the subformula is build only by
nesting and Boolean combinations of goals. In addition, with SL[BG] we avoid nested goals sharing
the variables of a same quantification prefix, but allow their Boolean combinations. Finally, SL[1G]
forces the use of a different quantification prefix for each single goal in the formula. The formal
syntax of SL[NG], SL[BG], and SL[1G] follows.
Definition 4.2 (SL[NG], SL[BG], and SL[1G] Syntax). SL[NG] formulas are built inductively
from the sets of atomic propositions AP, quantification prefixes Qnt(V) for any V ⊆ Var, and
binding prefixes Bnd(Var), by using the following grammar, with p ∈ AP, ℘ ∈ ∪V⊆VarQnt(V),
and ♭ ∈ Bnd(Var):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ R ϕ | ℘ϕ | ♭ϕ,
where in the formation rule ℘ϕ it is ensured that ϕ is agent-closed and ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ϕ)).
In addition, SL[BG] formulas are determined by splitting the above syntactic class in two different
parts, of which the second is dedicated to build the Boolean combinations of goals avoiding their
nesting:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ R ϕ | ℘ψ,
ψ ::= ♭ϕ | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | ψ ∨ ψ,
where in the formation rule ℘ψ it is ensured that ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ψ)).
Finally, the simpler SL[1G] formulas are obtained by forcing each goal to be coupled with a quan-
tification prefix:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ R ϕ | ℘♭ϕ,
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where in the formation rule ℘♭ϕ it is ensured that ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(♭ϕ)).
SL ⊃ SL[NG] ⊃ SL[BG] ⊃ SL[1G] denotes the syntactic chain of infinite sets of formulas generated
by the respective grammars with the associated constraints on free variables of goals.
Intuitively, in SL[NG], SL[BG], and SL[1G], we force the writing of formulas to use atomic blocks
of quantifications and bindings, where the related free variables are strictly coupled with those that
are effectively quantified in the prefix just before the binding. In a nutshell, we can only write
formulas by using sentences of the form ℘ψ belonging to a kind of prenex normal form in which the
quantifications contained into the matrix ψ only belong to the prefixes ℘′ of some inner subsentence
℘′ψ′ ∈ snt(℘ψ).
An SL[NG] sentence φ is principal if it is of the form φ = ℘ψ, where ψ is agent-closed and
℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ψ)). By psnt(ϕ) ⊆ snt(ϕ) we denote the set of all principal subsentences of the
formula ϕ.
We now introduce other two general restrictions in which the numbers |Ag| of agents and |Var| of
variables that are used to write a formula are fixed to the a priori values n,m ∈ [1, ω[ , respectively.
Moreover, we can also forbid the sharing of variables, i.e., each variable is binded to one agent only,
so, we cannot force two agents to use the same strategy. We name these three fragments SL[n-ag],
SL[m-var], and SL[fvs], respectively. Note that, in the one agent fragment, the restriction on the
sharing of variables between agents, naturally, does not act, i.e., SL[1-ag, fvs] = SL[1-ag].
To start to practice with the above fragments, consider again the sentence ϕ of Exam-
ple 2.19 on page 12. It is easy to see that it actually belongs to SL[BG, 2-ag, 3-var, 2-alt], and so,
to SL[NG], but not to SL[1G], since it is of the form ℘(♭1X p ∧ ♭2X q), where the quantification
prefix is ℘ = 〈〈x〉〉[[y]]〈〈z〉〉 and the binding prefixes of the two goals are ♭1 = (α, x)(β, y) and
♭2 = (α, y)(β, z).
Along the paper, sometimes we assert that a given formula ϕ belongs to an SL syntactic frag-
ment also if its syntax does not precisely correspond to what is described by the relative gram-
mar. We do this in order to make easier the reading and interpretation of the formula ϕ itself
and only in the case that it is simple to translate it into an equivalent formula that effectively be-
longs to the intended logic, by means of a simple generalization of classic rules used to put a
formula of first order logic in the prenex normal form. For example, consider the sentence ϕNE
of Example 2.6 on page 9 representing the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This formula is con-
sidered to belong to SL[BG, n-ag, 2n-var, fvs, 1-alt], since it can be easily translated in the form
φNE = ℘
∧n
i=1 ♭iψi → ♭ψi, where ℘ = 〈〈x1〉〉 · · · 〈〈xn〉〉[[y1]] · · · [[yn]], ♭ = (α1, x1) · · · (αn, xn),
♭i = (α1, x1) · · · (αi−1, xi−1)(αi, yi)(αi+1, xi+1) · · · (αn, xn), and free(ψi) = Ag. As another ex-
ample, consider the sentence ϕSP of Example 2.7 on page 9 representing the existence of a stability
profile. Also this formula is considered to belong to SL[BG, n-ag, 2n-var, fvs, 1-alt], since it is equiv-
alent to φSP = ℘
∧n
i,j=1,i6=j ♭ψj → ((♭ψi ↔ ♭iψi) → ♭iψj). Note that both φNE and φSP are
principal sentences.
Now, it is interesting to observe that CTL∗ and ATL∗ are exactly equivalent to SL[1G, fvs, 0-alt]
and SL[1G, fvs, 1-alt], respectively. Moreover, GL [Alur et al. 2002] is the very simple fragment of
SL[BG, fvs, 1-alt] that forces all goals in a formula to have a common part containing all variables
quantified before the unique possible alternation of the quantification prefix. Finally, we have that
CHP-SL is the TB-SL[BG, 2-ag, fvs] fragment.
Remark 4.3 (TB-SL[NG] Model-Checking Hardness). It is well-known that the non-elementary
hardness result for the satisfiability problem of QPTL [Sistla et al. 1987] already holds for formulas
in prenex normal form. Now, it is not hard to see that the transformation described in Lemma 3.4
of QPTL reduction puts QPTL[k-alt] sentences ϕ in prenex normal form into TB-SL[NG, 1-ag, k-alt]
variable-closed formulas ϕ = ℘ψ. Moreover, the derived TB-SL[1-ag, k-alt] sentence 〈〈x〉〉(α, x)℘ψ
used in Theorem 3.5 of TB-SL model-checking hardness is equivalent to the TB-SL[NG, 1-ag, k-
alt] principal sentence 〈〈x〉〉℘(α, x)ψ, since x is not used in the quantification prefix ℘. Thus, the
hardness result for the model-checking problem holds for TB-SL[NG, 1-ag, k-alt] and, consequently,
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for SL[NG, 1-ag, k-alt] as well. However, it is important to observe that, unfortunately, it is not know
if such an hardness result holds for TB-SL[BG] or SL[BG] and, in particular, for CHP-SL. We leave
this problem open here.
s0
∅
s1
p
s2
∅
D1 DcG1 \D1
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(a) CGS G1.
s0
∅
s1
p
s2
∅
D2 DcG2 \D2
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(b) CGS G2.
Fig. 5: Alternation-2 non-equivalent CGSs.
At this point, we prove that ATL∗ is strictly less expressive than SL[1G] and, consequently, than
SL[BG] and SL[NG]. To do this, we show the existence of two structures that result to be equivalent
only w.r.t. sentences having alternation number bounded by 1. It can be interesting to note that,
we use an ad-hoc technique based on a brute-force check to verify that all ATL∗ formulas cannot
distinguish between the two structures. A possible future line of research is to study variants of
the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game [Ebbinghaus and Flum 1995; Hodges 1993] for SL, which allow to
determine whether two structures are or not equivalent w.r.t. a particular SL fragment.
THEOREM 4.4 (SL[1G] VS ATL∗ EXPRESSIVENESS). There exists an SL[1G, 3-ag, fvs, 2-alt]
sentence having no ATL∗ equivalent.
PROOF. Consider the two CGSs G1 , 〈{p}, {α, β, γ}, {0, 1}, {s0, s1, s2}, λ, τ1, s0〉 and G2 ,
〈{p}, {α, β, γ}, {0, 1, 2}, {s0, s1, s2}, λ, τ2, s0〉 depicted in Figure 5, where λ(s0) = λ(s2) , ∅,
λ(s1) , {p}, D1 , {00∗, 11∗}, and D2 , {00∗, 11∗, 12∗, 200, 202, 211}. Moreover, consider the
SL[1G, 3-ag, fvs, 2-alt] sentence ϕ∗ , ℘∗♭∗X p, where ℘∗ , [[x]]〈〈y〉〉[[z]] and ♭∗ , (α, x)(β, y)(γ, z).
Then, it is easy to see that G1 |= ϕ∗ but G2 6|= ϕ∗. Indeed, G1, χ1, s0 |= ♭∗X p, for all
χ1 ∈ AsgG1({x, y, z}, s0) such that χ1(y)(s0) = χ1(x)(s0), and G2, χ2, s0 |= ♭
∗X ¬p, for all
χ2 ∈ AsgG2({x, y, z}, s0) such that χ2(x)(s0) = 2 and χ2(z)(s0) = (χ2(y)(s0) + 1) mod 3.
Now, due to the particular structure of the CGSs Gi under exam, with i ∈ {1, 2}, for each path
π ∈ PthGi(s0), we have that either λ((π)j) = {p} or λ((π)j) = ∅, for all j ∈ [1, ω[ , i.e., apart
from the initial state, the path is completely labeled either with {p} or with ∅. Thus, it is easy to see
that, for each ATL∗ formula ℘♭ψ, there is a literal lψ ∈ {p,¬p} such that Gi |= ℘♭ψ iff Gi |= ℘♭Xlψ,
for all i ∈ {1, 2}. W.l.o.g., we can suppose that ♭ = ♭∗, since we are always able to uniformly
rename the variables of the quantification and binding prefixes without changing the meaning of the
sentence.
At this point, it is easy to see that there exists an index k ∈ {1, 2, 3} for which it holds that either
℘k♭
∗Xlψ ⇒ ℘♭∗Xlψ or ℘♭∗Xlψ ⇒ ℘k ♭∗Xlψ, where ℘1 , [[x]][[z]]〈〈y〉〉, ℘2 , 〈〈x〉〉〈〈y〉〉[[z]], and
℘3 , [[y]][[z]]〈〈x〉〉. Thus, to prove that every ATL∗ formula cannot distinguish between G1 and G2,
we can simply show that the sentences ℘k♭∗Xl, with k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and l ∈ {p,¬p}, do the same. In
fact, it holds that Gi |= ℘k♭∗Xl, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and l ∈ {p,¬p}. Hence, the thesis
holds. The check of the latter fact is trivial and left to the reader as an exercise.
4.2. Dependence Maps
We now introduce the concept of dependence map of a quantification and show how any quantifica-
tion prefix contained into an SL formula can be represented by an adequate choice of a dependence
map over strategies. The main idea here is inspired by what Skolem proposed for the first order
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logic in order to eliminate each existential quantification over variables, by substituting them with
second order existential quantifications over functions, whose choice is uniform w.r.t. the universal
variables.
First, we introduce some notation regarding quantification prefixes. Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quan-
tification prefix over a set V(℘) , V ⊆ Var of variables. By 〈〈℘〉〉 , {x ∈ V(℘) : ∃i ∈ [0,
|℘|[ . (℘)i = 〈〈x〉〉} and [[℘]] , V(℘) \ 〈〈℘〉〉 we denote, respectively, the sets of existential and
universal variables quantified in ℘. For two variables x, y ∈ V(℘), we say that x precedes y in ℘, in
symbols x<℘y, if x occurs before y in ℘, i.e., there are two indexes i, j ∈ [0, |℘|[, with i < j, such
that (℘)i ∈ {〈〈x〉〉, [[x]]} and (℘)j ∈ {〈〈y〉〉, [[y]]}. Moreover, we say that y is functional dependent
on x, in symbols x ℘y, if x ∈ [[℘]], y ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉, and x<℘y, i.e., y is existentially quantified after that
x is universally quantified, so, there may be a dependence between a value chosen by x and that
chosen by y. This definition induces the set Dep(℘) , {(x, y) ∈ V(℘)×V(℘) : x ℘y} of depen-
dence pairs and its derived version Dep(℘, y) , {x ∈ V(℘) : x ℘y} containing all variables from
which y depends. Finally, we use ℘ ∈ Qnt(V(℘)) to indicate the quantification derived from ℘ by
dualizing each quantifier contained in it, i.e., for all indexes i ∈ [0, |℘|[, it holds that (℘)i = 〈〈x〉〉 iff
(℘)i = [[x]], with x ∈ V(℘). It is evident that 〈〈℘〉〉 = [[℘]] and [[℘]] = 〈〈℘〉〉. As an example, let ℘ =
[[x]]〈〈y〉〉〈〈z〉〉[[w]]〈〈v〉〉. Then, we have 〈〈℘〉〉 = {y, z, v}, [[℘]] = {x,w}, Dep(℘, x) = Dep(℘,w) = ∅,
Dep(℘, y) = Dep(℘, z) = {x}, Dep(℘, v) = {x,w}, and ℘ = 〈〈x〉〉[[y]][[z]]〈〈w〉〉[[v]].
Finally, we define the notion of valuation of variables over a generic set D, called domain, i.e.,
a partial function v : Var ⇀ D mapping every variable in its domain to an element in D. By
ValD(V) , V→ D we denote the set of all valuation functions over D defined on V ⊆ Var.
At this point, we give a general high-level semantics for the quantification prefixes by means of
the following main definition of dependence map.
Definition 4.5 (Dependence Maps). Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification prefix over a set V ⊆
Var of variables, and D a set. Then, a dependence map for ℘ over D is a function θ : ValD([[℘]])→
ValD(V) satisfying the following properties:
(1) θ(v)↾[[℘]]=v, for all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]); 9
(2) θ(v1)(x)=θ(v2)(x), for all v1, v2∈ValD([[℘]]) and x∈〈〈℘〉〉 such that v1↾Dep(℘,x)=v2↾Dep(℘,x).
DMD(℘) denotes the set of all dependence maps for ℘ over D.
Intuitively, Item 1 asserts that θ takes the same values of its argument w.r.t. the universal variables
in ℘ and Item 2 ensures that the value of θ w.r.t. an existential variable x in ℘ does not depend
on variables not in Dep(℘, x). To get a better insight into this definition, a dependence map θ for
℘ can be considered as a set of Skolem functions that, given a value for each variable in V(℘)
that is universally quantified in ℘, returns a possible value for all the existential variables in ℘,
in a way that is consistent w.r.t. the order of quantifications. Observe that, each θ ∈ DMD(℘) is
injective, so, |rng(θ)| = |dom(θ)| = |D||[[℘]]|. Moreover, |DMD(℘)| = ∏x∈〈〈℘〉〉 |D||D|
|Dep(℘,x)|
.
As an example, let D = {0, 1} and ℘ = [[x]]〈〈y〉〉[[z]] ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification prefix over
V = {x, y, z}. Then, we have that |DMD(℘)| = 4 and |DMD(℘)| = 8. Moreover, the dependence
maps θi ∈ DMD(℘) with i ∈ [0, 3] and θi ∈ DMD(℘) with i ∈ [0, 7], for a particular fixed order,
are such that θ0(v)(y) = 0, θ1(v)(y) = v(x), θ2(v)(y) = 1 − v(x), and θ3(v)(y) = 1, for all v ∈
ValD([[℘]]), and θi(v)(x) = 0 with i ∈ [0, 3], θi(v)(x) = 1 with i ∈ [4, 7], θ0(v)(z) = θ4(v)(z) = 0,
θ1(v)(z) = θ5(v)(z) = v(y), θ2(v)(z) = θ6(v)(z) = 1 − v(y), and θ3(v)(z) = θ7(v)(z) = 1, for
all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]).
We now prove the following fundamental theorem that describes how to eliminate the strategy
quantifications of an SL formula via a choice of a suitable dependence map over strategies. This
9By g↾Z : (X ∩ Z)→ Y we denote the restriction of a function g : X→ Y to the elements in the set Z.
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procedure can be seen as the equivalent of Skolemization in first order logic (see [Hodges 1993], for
more details).
THEOREM 4.6 (SL STRATEGY QUANTIFICATION). Let G be a CGS and ϕ = ℘ψ an SL for-
mula, being ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) a quantification prefix over a set V ⊆ free(ψ) ∩ Var of variables. Then,
for all assignments χ ∈ Asg(free(ϕ), s0), the following holds: G, χ, s0 |= ϕ iff there exists a depen-
dence map θ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘) such that G, χ ⋒ θ(χ′), s0 |= ψ, for all χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0). 10
PROOF. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the quantification prefix ℘. For
the base case |℘| = 0, the thesis immediately follows, since [[℘]] = ∅ and, consequently, both
DMStr(s0)(℘) and Asg([[℘]], s0) contain the empty function only (we are assuming, by convention,
that ∅(∅) , ∅).
We now prove, separately, the two directions of the inductive case.
[Only if]. Suppose that G, χ, s0 |= ϕ, where ℘ = Qn · ℘′. Then, two possible cases arise: either
Qn = 〈〈x〉〉 or Qn = [[x]].
— Qn = 〈〈x〉〉.
By Item 3a of Definition 2.16 of SL semantics, there is a strategy f ∈ Str(s0) such that G, χ[x 7→
f], s0 |= ℘′ψ. Note that [[℘]] = [[℘′]]. By the inductive hypothesis, we have that there exists
a dependence map θ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘′) such that G, χ[x 7→ f] ⋒ θ(χ′), s0 |= ψ, for all χ′ ∈
Asg([[℘′]], s0). Now, consider the function θ′ : Asg([[℘]], s0) → Asg(V, s0) defined by θ′(χ′) ,
θ(χ′)[x 7→ f], for all χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0). It is easy to check that θ′ is a dependence map for ℘ over
Str(s0), i.e., θ′ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘). Moreover, χ[x 7→ f] ⋒ θ(χ′) = χ ⋒ θ(χ′)[x 7→ f] = χ ⋒ θ′(χ′),
for χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0). Hence, G, χ ⋒ θ′(χ′), s0 |= ψ, for all χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0).
— Qn = [[x]].
By Item 3b of Definition 2.16, we have that, for all strategies f ∈ Str(s0), it holds that G, χ[x 7→
f], s0 |= ℘′ψ. Note that [[℘]] = [[℘′]]∪{x}. By the inductive hypothesis, we derive that, for each f ∈
Str(s0), there exists a dependence map θf ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘′) such that G, χ[x 7→ f] ⋒ θf(χ′), s0 |=
ψ, for all χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘′]], s0). Now, consider the function θ′ : Asg([[℘]], s0) → Asg(V, s0)
defined by θ′(χ′) , θχ′(x)(χ′↾[[℘′]])[x 7→ χ′(x)], for all χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0). It is evident that θ′ is
a dependence map for ℘ over Str(s0), i.e., θ′ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘). Moreover, χ[x 7→ f] ⋒ θf(χ′) =
χ ⋒ θf(χ
′)[x 7→ f] = χ ⋒ θ′(χ′[x 7→ f]), for f ∈ Str(s0) and χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘′]], s0). Hence,
G, χ ⋒ θ′(χ′), s0 |= ψ, for all χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0).
[If]. Suppose that there exists a dependence map θ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘) such that G, χ ⋒ θ(χ′), s0 |=
ψ, for all χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0), where ℘ = Qn ·℘′. Then, two possible cases arise: either Qn = 〈〈x〉〉
or Qn = [[x]].
— Qn = 〈〈x〉〉.
There is a strategy f ∈ Str(s0) such that f = θ(χ′)(x), for all χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0). Note that
[[℘]] = [[℘′]]. Consider the function θ′ : Asg([[℘′]], s0) → Asg(V \ {x}, s0) defined by θ′(χ′) ,
θ(χ′)↾(V\{x}), for all χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘′]], s0). It is easy to check that θ′ is a dependence map for ℘′
over Str(s0), i.e., θ′ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘′). Moreover, χ ⋒ θ(χ′) = χ ⋒ θ′(χ′)[x 7→ f] = χ[x 7→
f] ⋒ θ′(χ′), for χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘′]], s0). Then, it is evident that G, χ[x → f] ⋒ θ′(χ′), s0 |= ψ, for all
χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘′]], s0). By the inductive hypothesis, we derive that G, χ[x 7→ f], s0 |= ℘′ψ, which
means that G, χ, s0 |= ϕ, by Item 3a of Definition 2.16 of SL semantics.
— Qn = [[x]].
First note that [[℘]] = [[℘′]] ∪ {x}. Also, consider the functions θ′f : Asg([[℘′]], s0) → Asg(V \
{x}, s0) defined by θ′f(χ′) , θ(χ′[x 7→ f])↾(V\{x}), for each f ∈ Str(s0) and χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘′]], s0).
10By g1 ⋒ g2 : (X1 ∪ X2) → (Y1 ∪ Y2) we denote the operation of union of two functions g1 : X1 → Y1 and
g2 : X2 → Y2 defined on disjoint domains, i.e., X1 ∩ X2 = ∅.
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It is easy to see that every θ′f is a dependence map for ℘′ over Str(s0), i.e., θ′f ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘′).
Moreover, χ ⋒ θ(χ′) = χ ⋒ θ′χ′(x)(χ
′
↾[[℘′]])[x 7→ χ
′(x)] = χ[x 7→ χ′(x)] ⋒ θ′χ′(x)(χ
′
↾[[℘′]]), for
χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0). Then, it is evident that G, χ[x → f] ⋒ θ′f(χ′), s0 |= ψ, for all f ∈ Str(s0) and
χ′ ∈ Asg([[℘′]], s0). By the inductive hypothesis, we derive that G, χ[x 7→ f], s0 |= ℘′ψ, for all
f ∈ Str(s0), which means that G, χ, s0 |= ϕ, by Item 3b of Definition 2.16.
Thus, the thesis of the theorem holds.
As an immediate consequence of the previous result, we derive the following corollary.
COROLLARY 4.7 (SL STRATEGY QUANTIFICATION). Let G be a CGS and ϕ = ℘ψ an SL
sentence, where ψ is agent-closed and ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ψ)). Then, G |= ϕ iff there exists a dependence
map θ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘) such that G, θ(χ), s0 |= ψ, for all χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0).
4.3. Elementary quantifications
We now have all tools we need to introduce the property of elementariness for a particular class of
dependence maps. Intuitively, a dependence map over functions from a setT to a setD is elementary
if it can be split into a set of dependence maps over D, one for each element of T. This idea
allows us to enormously simplify the reasoning about strategy quantifications, since we can reduce
them to a set of quantifications over actions, one for each track in their domains. This means that,
under certain conditions, we can transform a dependence map θ ∈ DMStr(s)(℘) over strategies in a
function θ˜ : Trk(s)→ DMAc(℘) that associates with each track a dependence map over actions.
To formally develop the above idea, we have first to introduce the generic concept of adjoint
function and state an auxiliary lemma.
Definition 4.8 (Adjoint Functions). Let D, T, U, and V be four sets, and m : (T → D)U →
(T → D)V and m˜ : T → (DU → DV) two functions. Then, m˜ is the adjoint of m if
m˜(t)(ĝ(t))(x) = m(g)(x)(t), for all g ∈ (T→ D)U, x ∈ V, and t ∈ T 11
Intuitively, m˜ is the adjoint of m if the dependence from the set T in both domain and codomain
of the latter can be extracted and put as a common factor of the functor given by the former. This
means also that, for every pair of functions g1, g2 ∈ (T → D)U such that ĝ1(t) = ĝ2(t) for some
t ∈ T, it holds that m(g1)(x)(t) = m(g2)(x)(t), for all x ∈ V. It is immediate to observe that if a
function has an adjoint then this adjoint is unique. At the same way, if one has an adjoint function
then it is possible to determine the original function without any ambiguity. Thus, it is established a
one-to-one correspondence between functions admitting an adjoint and the adjoint itself.
Next lemma formally states the property briefly described above, i.e., that each dependence map
over a set T→ D, admitting an adjoint function, can be represented as a function, with T as domain,
which returns dependence maps over D as values.
LEMMA 4.9 (ADJOINT DEPENDENCE MAPS). Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification prefix over
a set V ⊆ Var of variables, D and T two sets, and θ : ValT→D([[℘]])→ ValT→D(V) and θ˜ : T→
(ValD([[℘]]) → ValD(V)) two functions such that θ˜ is the adjoint of θ. Then, θ ∈ DMT→D(℘) iff,
for all t ∈ T, it holds that θ˜(t) ∈ DMD(℘).
We now define the formal meaning of the elementariness of a dependence map over functions.
Definition 4.10 (Elementary Dependence Maps). Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification pre-
fix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables, D and T two sets, and θ ∈ DMT→D(℘) a dependence
map for ℘ over T → D. Then, θ is elementary if it admits an adjoint function. EDMT→D(℘)
denotes the set of all elementary dependence maps for ℘ over T→ D.
11By ĝ : Y → X→ Z we denote the operation of flipping of a function g : X→ Y → Z.
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It is important to observe that, unfortunately, there are dependence maps that are not elemen-
tary. To easily understand why this is actually the case, it is enough to count both the number
of dependence maps DMT→D(℘) and of adjoint functions T → DMD(℘), where |D| > 1,
|T| > 1 and ℘ is such that there is an x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 for which Dep(℘, x) 6= ∅. Indeed, it holds that
|DMT→D(℘)| =
∏
x∈〈〈℘〉〉 |D|
|T|·|D||T|·|Dep(℘,x)| >
∏
x∈〈〈℘〉〉 |D|
|T|·|D||Dep(℘,x)| = |T → DMD(℘)|.
So, there are much more dependence maps, a number double exponential in |T|, than possible ad-
joint functions, whose number is only exponential in this value. Furthermore, observe that the simple
set Qnt∃∗∀∗(V) , {℘ ∈ Qnt(V) : ∃i ∈ [0, |℘|] . [[(℘)<i]] = ∅ ∧ 〈〈(℘)≥i〉〉 = ∅}, for V ⊆ Var,
is the maximal class of quantification prefixes that admits only elementary dependence maps over
T → D, i.e., it is such that each θ ∈ DMT→D(℘) is elementary, for all ℘ ∈ Qnt∃∗∀∗(V). This is
due to the fact that there are no functional dependences between variables, i.e., for each x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉,
it holds that Dep(℘, x) = ∅.
Finally, we can introduce a new very important semantics for SL syntactic fragments, which is
based on the concept of elementary dependence map over strategies, and we refer to the related
satisfiability concept as elementary satisfiability, in symbols |=E. Intuitively, such a semantics has
the peculiarity that a strategy, used in an existential quantification in order to satisfy a formula, is
only chosen between those that are elementary w.r.t. the universal quantifications. In this way, when
we have to decide what is its value c on a given track ρ, we do it only in dependence of the values
on the same track of the strategies so far quantified, but not on their whole structure, as it is the
case instead of the classic semantics. This means that c does not depend on the values of the other
strategies on tracks ρ′ that extend ρ, i.e., it does not depend on future choices made on ρ′. In addition,
we have that c does not depend on values on parallel tracks ρ′ that only share a prefix with ρ, i.e.,
it is independent on choices made on the possibly alternative futures ρ′. The elementary semantics
of SL[NG] formulas involving atomic propositions, Boolean connectives, temporal operators, and
agent bindings is defined as for the classic one, where the modeling relation |= is substituted with
|=E, and we omit to report it here. In the following definition, we only describe the part concerning
the quantification prefixes.
Definition 4.11 (SL[NG] Elementary Semantics). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St one of its states, and
℘ψ an SL[NG] formula, where ψ is agent-closed and ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ψ)). Then G,∅, s |=E ℘ψ
if there is an elementary dependence map θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘) for ℘ over Str(s) such that
G, θ(χ), s |=E ψ, for all χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s).
It is immediate to see a strong similarity between the statement of Corollary 4.7 of SL strategy quan-
tification and the previous definition. The only crucial difference resides in the choice of the kind of
dependence map. Moreover, observe that, differently from the classic semantics, the quantifications
in the prefix are not treated individually but as an atomic block. This is due to the necessity of having
a strict correlation between the point-wise structure of the quantified strategies.
Remark 4.12 (SL Elementary Semantics). It can be interesting to know that we do not define
an elementary semantics for the whole SL, since we are not able, at the moment, to easily use the
concept of elementary dependence map, when the quantifications are not necessarily grouped in pre-
fixes, i.e., when the formula is not in prenex normal form. In fact, this may represent a challenging
problem, whose solution is left to future works.
Due to the new semantics of SL[NG], we have to redefine the related concepts of model and
satisfiability, in order to differentiate between the classic relation |= and the elementary one |=E.
Indeed, as we show later, there are sentences that are satisfiable but not elementary satisfiable and
vice versa.
Definition 4.13 (SL[NG] Elementary Satisfiability). We say that a CGS G is an elementary
model of an SL[NG] sentence ϕ, in symbols G |=E ϕ, if G,∅, s0 |=E ϕ. In general, we also say
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that G is a elementary model for ϕ on s ∈ St, in symbols G, s |=E ϕ, if G,∅, s |=E ϕ. An SL[NG]
sentence ϕ is elementarily satisfiable if there is an elementary model for it.
We have to modify the concepts of implication and equivalence, as well. Indeed, also in this case
we can have pairs of equivalent formulas that are not elementarily equivalent, and vice versa. Thus,
we have to be careful when we use natural transformation between formulas, since it can be the case
that they preserve the meaning only under the classic semantics. An example of this problem can
arise when one want to put a formula in pnf.
Definition 4.14 (SL[NG] Elementary Implication and Equivalence). Given two SL[NG] formu-
las ϕ1 and ϕ2 with free(ϕ1) = free(ϕ2), we say that ϕ1 elementarily implies ϕ2, in sym-
bols ϕ1 ⇒E ϕ2, if, for all CGSs G, states s ∈ St, and free(ϕ1)-defined s-total assignments
χ ∈ Asg(free(ϕ1), s), it holds that if G, χ, s |=E ϕ1 then G, χ, s |=E ϕ2. Accordingly, we say
that ϕ1 is elementarily equivalent to ϕ2, in symbols ϕ1 ≡E ϕ2, if both ϕ1 ⇒E ϕ2 and ϕ2 ⇒E ϕ1
hold.
4.4. Elementariness and non-elementariness
Finally, we show that the introduced concept of elementary satisfiability is relevant to the context
of our logic, as its applicability represents a demarcation line between “easy” and “hard” fragments
of SL. Moreover, we believe that it is because of this fundamental property that several well-known
temporal logics are so robustly decidable [Vardi 1996].
Remark 4.15 (SL[NG, 0-alt] Elementariness). It is interesting to observe that, for every CGS G
and SL[NG, 0-alt] sentence ϕ, it holds that G |= ϕ iff G |=E ϕ. This is an immediate consequence of
the fact that all quantification prefixes℘ used in ϕ belong to Qnt∃∗∀∗(V), for a given setV ⊆ Var of
variables. Thus, as already mentioned, the related dependence maps on strategies θ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘)
are necessarily elementary.
By Corollary 4.7 of SL strategy quantification, it is easy to see that the following coherence
property about the elementariness of the SL[NG] satisfiability holds. Intuitively, it asserts that every
elementarily satisfiable sentence in pnf is satisfiable too.
THEOREM 4.16 (SL[NG] ELEMENTARY COHERENCE). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St one of its
states, ϕ an SL[NG] formula in pnf, and χ ∈ Asg(s) an s-total assignment with free(ϕ) ⊆ dom(χ).
Then, it holds that G, χ, s |=E ϕ implies G, χ, s |= ϕ.
PROOF. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the formula. For the sake of suc-
cinctness, we only show the crucial case of principal subsentences φ ∈ psnt(ϕ), i.e., when φ is of
the form ℘ψ, where ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ψ)) is a quantification prefix, and ψ is an agent-closed formula.
Suppose that G,∅, s |=E ℘ψ. Then, by Definition 4.11 of SL[NG] elementary semantics, there is
an elementary dependence map θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘) such that, for all assignments χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s),
it holds that G, θ(χ), s |=E ψ. Now, by the inductive hypothesis, there is a dependence map θ ∈
DMStr(s)(℘) such that, for all assignments χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s), it holds that G, θ(χ), s |= ψ. Hence,
by Corollary 4.7 of SL strategy quantification, we have that G,∅, s |= ℘ψ.
However, it is worth noting that the converse property may not hold, as we show in the next
theorem, i.e., there are sentences in pnf that are satisfiable but not elementarily satisfiable. Note that
the following results already holds for CHP-SL.
THEOREM 4.17 (TB-SL[BG] NON-ELEMENTARINESS). There exists a satisfiable TB-
SL[BG, 1-ag, 2-var, 1-alt] sentence in pnf that is not elementarily satisfiable.
PROOF. Consider the TB-SL[BG, 1-ag, 2-var, 1-alt] sentence ϕ , ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 in pnf where
ϕ1 , ℘(ψ1 ∧ ψ2), with ℘ , [[x]]〈〈y〉〉, ψ1 , (α, x)X p ↔ (α, y)X ¬p, and ψ2 , (α, x)X X p ↔
(α, y)X X p, and ϕ2 , [[x]](α, x)X ((〈〈x〉〉(α, x)X p) ∧ (〈〈x〉〉(α, x)X ¬p)). Moreover, note that the
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TB-SL[1G, 1-ag, 1-var, 0-alt] sentence ϕ2 is equivalent to the CTL formula AX ((EX p) ∧ (EX ¬p)).
Then, it is easy to see that the turn-based CGS GRdc of Figure 4 on page 15 satisfies ϕ. Indeed,
GRdc, θ(χ), s0 |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2, for all assignments χ ∈ Asg({x}, s0), where the non-elementary de-
pendence map θ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘) is such that θ(χ)(y)(s0) = ¬χ(x)(s0) and θ(χ)(y)(s0 · si) =
χ(x)(s0 · s1−i), for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
Now, let G be a generic CGS. If G 6|= ϕ, by Theorem 4.16 of SL[NG] elementary co-
herence, it holds that G 6|=E ϕ. Otherwise, we have that G |= ϕ and, in particular, G |=
ϕ1, which means that G |= ℘(ψ1 ∧ ψ2). At this point, to prove that G 6|=E ϕ, we show
that, for all elementary dependence maps θ ∈ EDMStr(s0)(℘), there exists an assignment
χ ∈ Asg({x}, s0) such that G, θ(χ), s0 6|=E ψ1 ∧ ψ2. To do this, let us fix an elementary
dependence map θ and an assignment χ. Also, assume s1 , τ(s0, ∅[α 7→ χ(x)(s0)]) and
s2 , τ(s0, ∅[α 7→ θ(χ)(y)(s0)]). Now, we distinguish between two cases.
— p ∈ λ(s1) iff p ∈ λ(s2). In this case, we can easily observe that G, θ(χ), s0 6|= ψ1 and conse-
quently, by Theorem 4.16, it holds that G, θ(χ), s0 6|=E ψ1 ∧ ψ2. So, we are done.
— p ∈ λ(s1) iff p 6∈ λ(s2). If G, θ(χ), s0 6|= ψ2 then, by Theorem 4.16, it holds that G, θ(χ), s0 6|=E
ψ1 ∧ψ2. So, we are done. Otherwise, let s3 , τ(s1, ∅[α 7→ χ(x)(s0 · s1)]) and s4 , τ(s2, ∅[α 7→
θ(χ)(y)(s0 · s2)]). Then, it holds that p ∈ λ(s3) iff p ∈ λ(s4). Now, consider a new assignment
χ′ ∈ Asg({x}, s0) such that χ′(x)(s0 · s2) = χ(x)(s0 · s2) and p ∈ λ(s3′) iff p 6∈ λ(s4),
where s3′ , τ(s1, ∅[α 7→ χ′(x)(s0 · s1)]). Observe that the existence of such an assignment, with
particular reference to the second condition, is ensured by the fact that G |= ϕ2. At this point, due
to the elementariness of the dependence map θ, we have that θ(χ′)(y)(s0 · s2) = θ(χ)(y)(s0 · s2).
Consequently, it holds that s4 = τ(s2, ∅[α 7→ θ(χ′)(y)(s0 · s2)]). Thus, G, θ(χ′), s0 6|= ψ2, which
implies, by Theorem 4.16, that G, θ(χ′), s0 6|=E ψ1 ∧ ψ2. So, we are done.
Thus, the thesis of the theorem holds.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous theorem. It is interesting
to note that, at the moment, we do not know if such a result can be extended to the simpler GL
fragment.
COROLLARY 4.18 (SL[BG] NON-ELEMENTARINESS). There exists a satisfiable SL[BG, 1-ag,
2-var, 1-alt] sentence in pnf that is not elementarily satisfiable.
Remark 4.19 (Kinds of Non-Elementariness). It is worth remarking that the kind of non-
elementariness of the sentence ϕ shown in the above theorem can be called essential, i.e.,
it cannot be eliminated, due to the fact that ϕ is satisfiable but not elementarily satisfiable.
However, there are different sentences, such as the conjunct ϕ1 in ϕ, having both models on
which they are elementarily satisfiable and models, like the CGS GRdc, on which they are
only non-elementarily satisfiable. Such a kind of non-elementariness can be called non-essential,
since it can be eliminated by an opportune choice of the underlying model. Note that a sim-
ilar reasoning can be done for the dual concept of elementariness, which we call essential
if all models satisfying a given sentence elementarily satisfy it as well.
Before continuing, we want to show the reason why we have redefined the concepts of implica-
tion and equivalence in the context of elementary semantics. Consider the SL[BG, 1-ag, 2-var, 1-alt]
sentence ϕ1 used in Theorem 4.17 of TB-SL[BG] non-elementariness. It is not hard to see that it is
equivalent to the SL[1G, 1-ag, 1-var, 0-alt] ϕ′ , (〈〈x〉〉(α, x)ψ1 ↔ 〈〈x〉〉(α, x)ψ2) ∧ (〈〈x〉〉(α, x)ψ3 ↔
〈〈x〉〉(α, x)ψ4), where ψ1 , X (p∧X p), ψ2 , X (¬p∧X p), ψ3 , X (p∧X ¬p), and ψ4 , X (¬p∧
X ¬p). Note that ϕ′ is in turn equivalent to the CTL∗ formula (Eψ1 ↔ Eψ2) ∧ (Eψ3 ↔ Eψ4). How-
ever, ϕ1 and ϕ′ are not elementarily equivalent, since we have that GRdc 6|=E ϕ1 but GRdc |=E ϕ′,
where GRdc is the CGS of Figure 4 on page 15.
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At this point, we can proceed with the proof of the elementariness of satisfiability for SL[1G].
It is important to note that there is no gap, in our knowledge, between the logics that are elemen-
tarily satisfiable and those that are not, since the fragment SL[BG, 1-ag, 2-var, 1-alt] used in the pre-
vious theorem cannot be further reduced, due to the fact that otherwise it collapses into SL[1G].
Before starting, we have to describe some notation regarding classic two-player games on infinite
words [Perrin and Pin 2004], which are used here as a technical tool. Note that we introduce the
names of scheme and match in place of the more usual strategy and play, in order to avoid confu-
sion between the concepts related to a CGS and those related to the tool.
A two-player arena (TPA, for short) is a tuple A , 〈Ne,No,E , n0〉, where Ne and No are non-
empty non-intersecting sets of nodes for player even and odd, respectively, E , Ee ∪ Eo , with
Ee ⊆ Ne×No and Eo ⊆ No×Ne, is the edge relation between nodes, and n0 ∈ No is a designated
initial node.
An even position in A is a finite non-empty sequence of nodes ̺ ∈ Ne+ such that (̺)0 = n0
and, for all i ∈ [0, |̺| − 1[ , there exists a node n ∈ No for which ((̺)i, n) ∈ Ee and
(n, (̺)i+1) ∈ Eo hold. In addition, an odd position in A is a finite non-empty sequence of nodes
̺ = ̺′ · n ∈ Ne
+ · No, with n ∈ No, such that ̺′ is an even position and (lst(̺′), n) ∈ Ee .
By Pose and Poso we denote, respectively, the sets of even and odd positions.
An even (resp., odd) scheme inA is a function se : Pose → No (resp., so : Poso → Ne) that maps
each even (resp., odd) position to an odd (resp., even) node in a way that is compatible with the edge
relation Ee (resp., Eo), i.e., for all ̺ ∈ Pose (resp., ̺ ∈ Poso), it holds that (lst(̺), se(̺)) ∈ Ee
(resp., (lst(̺), so(̺)) ∈ Eo). By Sche (resp., Scho) we indicate the sets of even (resp., odd) schemes.
A match in A is an infinite sequence of nodes ̟ ∈ Neω such that (̟)0 = n0 and, for all i ∈ N,
there exists a node n ∈ No such that ((̟)i, n) ∈ Ee and (n, (̟)i+1) ∈ Eo . By Mtc we denote the
set of all matches. A match map mtc : Sche × Scho → Mtc is a function that, given two schemes
se ∈ Sche and so ∈ Scho, returns the unique match ̟ = mtc(se, so) such that, for all i ∈ N, it holds
that (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · se((̟)≤i)).
A two-player game (TPG, for short) is a tupleH , 〈A,Win〉, whereA is a TPA and Win ⊆ Mtc.
On one hand, we say that player even winsH if there exists an even scheme se ∈ Sche such that, for
all odd schemes so ∈ Scho, it holds that mtc(se, so) ∈ Win. On the other hand, we say that player
odd wins H if there exists an odd scheme so ∈ Scho such that, for all even schemes se ∈ Sche, it
holds that mtc(se, so) 6∈Win.
In the following, for a given binding prefix ♭ ∈ Bnd(V) with V ⊆ Var, we denote by ζ♭ : Ag→
V the function associating with each agent the related variable in ♭, i.e., for all a ∈ Ag, there is
i ∈ [0, |♭|[ such that (♭)i = (a, ζ♭(a)).
As first step towards the proof of the elementariness of SL[1G], we have to give a construction of
a two-player game, based on an a priori chosen CGS, in which the players are explicitly viewed one
as a dependence map and the other as a valuation, both over actions. This construction results to be
a deep technical evolution of the proof method used for the dualization of alternating automata on
infinite objects [Muller and Schupp 1987].
Definition 4.20 (Dependence-vs-Valuation Game). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St one of its states,
P ⊆ Pth(s) a set of paths, ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) a quantification prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables, and
♭ ∈ Bnd(V) a binding. Then, the dependence-vs-valuation game for G in s over P w.r.t. ℘ and ♭ is
the TPG H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭) , 〈A(G, s, ℘, ♭),P〉, where the TPA A(G, s, ℘, ♭) , 〈St, St × DMAc(℘),
E , s〉 has the edge relations defined as follows:
— Ee , {(t, (t, θ)) : t ∈ St ∧ θ ∈ DMAc(℘)};
— Eo , {((t, θ), τ(t, θ(v) ◦ ζ♭)) : t ∈ St ∧ θ ∈ DMAc(℘) ∧ v ∈ ValAc([[℘]])}
12
.
12By g2 ◦ g1 : X → Z we denote the operation of composition of two functions g1 : X → Y1 and g2 : Y2 → Z with
Y1 ⊆ Y2.
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In the next lemma we state a fundamental relationship between dependence-
vs-valuation games and their duals. Basically, we prove that if a player wins
the game then the opposite player can win the dual game, and vice versa.
This represents one of the two crucial steps in our elementariness proof.
LEMMA 4.21 (DEPENDENCE-VS-VALUATION DUALITY). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St one of its
states, P ⊆ Pth(s) a set of paths, ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) a quantification prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of
variables, and ♭ ∈ Bnd(V) a binding. Then, player even wins the TPG H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭) iff player
odd wins the dual TPG H(G, s,Pth(s) \ P, ℘, ♭).
Now, we are going to give the definition of the important concept of encasement. In-
formally, an encasement is a particular subset of paths in a given CGS that “works
to encase” an elementary dependence map on strategies, in the sense that it con-
tains all plays obtainable by complete assignments derived from the evaluation of the
above mentioned dependence map. In our context, this concept is used to summarize all
relevant information needed to verify the elementary satisfiability of a sentence.
Definition 4.22 (Encasement). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St one of its states, P ⊆ Pth(s) a set
of paths, ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) a quantification prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables, and ♭ ∈ Bnd(V)
a binding. Then, P is an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭ if there exists an elementary dependence map
θ∈EDMStr(s)(℘) such that, for all assignments χ∈Asg([[℘]], s), it holds that play(θ(χ)◦ ζ♭, s)∈P.
In the next lemma, we give the second of the two crucial steps in our elementariness proof. In
particular, we are able to show a one-to-one relationship between the wining in the dependence-
vs-valuation game of player even and the verification of the encasement property of the associated
winning set. Moreover, in the case that the latter is a Borelian set, by using Martin’s Determinacy
Theorem [Martin 1975], we obtain a complete characterization of the winning concept by means of
that of encasements.
LEMMA 4.23 (ENCASEMENT CHARACTERIZATION). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St one of its states,
P ⊆ Pth(s) a set of paths, ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) a quantification prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables,
and ♭ ∈ Bnd(V) a binding. Then, the following hold:
(i) player even wins H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭) iff P is an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭;
(ii) if player odd wins H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭) then P is not an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭;
(iii) if P is a Borelian set and it is not an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭ then player odd wins
H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭).
Finally, we have all technical tools useful to prove the elementariness of the satisfiability for
SL[1G]. Intuitively, we describe a bidirectional reduction of the problem of interest to the verification
of the winning in the dependence-vs-valuation game. The idea behind this construction resides
in the strong similarity between the statement of Corollary 4.7 of SL strategy quantification and
the definition of the winning condition in a two-player game. Indeed, on one hand, we say that a
sentence is satisfiable iff “there exists a dependence map such that, for all all assignments, it holds
that ...”. On the other hand, we say that player even wins a game iff “there exists an even scheme
such that, for all odd schemes, it holds that ...”. In particular, for the SL[1G] fragment, we can resolve
the gap between these two formulations, by using the concept of elementary quantification.
THEOREM 4.24 (SL[1G] ELEMENTARINESS). Let G be a CGS, ϕ an SL[1G] formula, s ∈ St a
state, andχ ∈ Asg(s) an s-total assignment with free(ϕ) ⊆ dom(χ). Then, it holds that G, χ, s |= ϕ
iff G, χ, s |=E ϕ.
PROOF. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the formula. For the sake of suc-
cinctness, we only show the most important inductive case of principal subsentences φ ∈ psnt(ϕ),
i.e., when φ is of the form ℘♭ψ, where ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) and ♭ ∈ Bnd(V) are, respectively, a quantifica-
tion and binding prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables, and ψ is a variable-closed formula.
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[If]. The proof of this direction is practically the same of the one used in Theorem 4.16 of SL[NG]
elementary coherence. So, we omit to report it here.
[Only if]. Assume that G,∅, s |= ℘♭ψ. Then, it is easy to see that, for all elementary dependence
maps θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘), there is an assignment χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s) such that G, θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s |= ψ. In-
deed, suppose by contradiction that there exists an elementary dependence map θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘)
such that, for all assignmentsχ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s), it holds that G, θ(χ)◦ζ♭, s 6|= ψ, i.e., G, θ(χ)◦ζ♭, s |=
¬ψ, and so G, θ(χ), s |= ♭¬ψ. Then, by Corollary 4.7 of SL strategy quantification, we have that
G,∅, s |= ℘♭¬ψ, i.e., G,∅, s |= ¬℘♭ψ, and so G,∅, s 6|= ℘♭ψ, which is impossible.
Now, let P , {play(χ, s) ∈ Pth(s) : χ ∈ Asg(Ag, s) ∧ G, χ, s 6|= ψ}. Then, it is evident that,
for all elementary dependence maps θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘), there is an assignment χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s)
such that play(θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s) 6∈ P.
At this point, by Definition 4.22 of encasement, it is clear thatP is not an encasement w.r.t.℘ and ♭.
Moreover, since ψ describes a regular language, the derived set P is Borelian [Perrin and Pin 2004].
Consequently, by Item iii of Lemma 4.23 of encasement characterization, we have that player odd
wins the TPG H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭). Thus, by Lemma 4.21 of dependence-vs-valuation duality, player
even wins the dual TPG H(G, s,Pth(s) \ P, ℘, ♭). Hence, by Item i of Lemma 4.23, we have that
Pth(s) \P is an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭. Finally, again by Definition 4.22, there exists an elemen-
tary dependence map θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘) such that, for all assignments χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s), it holds
that play(θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s) ∈ Pth(s) \ P.
Now, it is immediate to observe that Pth(s) \ P = {play(χ, s) ∈ Pth(s) : χ ∈ Asg(Ag, s) ∧
G, χ, s |= ψ}. So, by the inductive hypothesis, we have that Pth(s) \ P = {play(χ, s) ∈ Pth(s)
: χ ∈ Asg(Ag, s) ∧ G, χ, s |=E ψ}, from which we derive that there exists an elementary de-
pendence map θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘) such that, for all assignments χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s), it holds that
G, θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s |=E ψ. Consequently, by Definition 4.11 of SL[NG] elementary semantics, we have
that G,∅, s |=E ℘♭ψ.
As an immediate consequence of the previous theorem, we derive the following fundamental
corollary.
COROLLARY 4.25 (SL[1G] ELEMENTARINESS). Let G be a CGS and ϕ an SL[1G] sentence.
Then, G |= ϕ iff G |=E ϕ.
It is worth to observe that the elementariness property for SL[1G] is a crucial difference w.r.t.
SL[BG], which allows us to obtain an elementary decision procedure for the related model-checking
problem, as described in the last part of the next section.
5. MODEL-CHECKING PROCEDURES
In this section, we study the model-checking problem for SL and show that, in general, it is non-
elementarily decidable, while, in the particular case of SL[1G] sentences, it is just 2EXPTIME-
COMPLETE, as for ATL∗. For the algorithmic procedures, we follow an automata-theoretic ap-
proach [Kupferman et al. 2000], reducing the decision problem for the logics to the emptiness prob-
lem of an automaton. In particular, we use a bottom-up technique through which we recursively
label each state of the CGS of interest by all principal subsentences of the specification that are
satisfied on it, starting from the innermost subsentences and terminating with the sentence under
exam. In this way, at a given step of the recursion, since the satisfaction of all subsentences of the
given principal sentence has already been determined, we can assume that the matrix of the latter is
only composed by Boolean combinations and nesting of goals whose temporal part is simply LTL.
The procedure we propose here extends that used for ATL∗ in [Alur et al. 2002] by means of a richer
structure of the automata involved in.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Subsection 5.1, we recall the definition of
alternating parity tree automata. Then, in Subsection 5.2, we build an automaton accepting a tree
encoding of a CGS iff this satisfies the formula of interest, which is used to prove the main result
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about SL and SL[NG] model checking. Finally, in Subsection 5.3, we refine the previous result to
obtain an elementary decision procedure for SL[1G].
5.1. Alternating tree automata
Nondeterministic tree automata are a generalization to infinite trees of the classical nondetermin-
istic word automata on infinite words (see [Thomas 1990], for an introduction). Alternating tree
automata are a further generalization of nondeterministic tree automata [Muller and Schupp 1987].
Intuitively, on visiting a node of the input tree, while the latter sends exactly one copy of itself to
each of the successors of the node, the former can send several own copies to the same successor.
Here we use, in particular, alternating parity tree automata, which are alternating tree automata
along with a parity acceptance condition (see [Grädel et al. 2002], for a survey).
We now give the formal definition of alternating tree automata.
Definition 5.1 (Alternating Tree Automata). An alternating tree automaton (ATA, for short) is
a tuple A , 〈Σ,∆,Q, δ, q0,ℵ〉, where Σ, ∆, and Q are, respectively, non-empty finite sets of input
symbols, directions, and states, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, ℵ is an acceptance condition to be defined
later, and δ : Q × Σ → B+(∆ × Q) is an alternating transition function that maps each pair of
states and input symbols to a positive Boolean combination on the set of propositions of the form
(d, q) ∈ ∆×Q, a.k.a. moves.
On one side, a nondeterministic tree automaton (NTA, for short) is a special case of ATA in
which each conjunction in the transition function δ has exactly one move (d, q) associated with
each direction d. This means that, for all states q ∈ Q and symbols σ ∈ Σ, we have that δ(q, σ) is
equivalent to a Boolean formula of the form
∨
i
∧
d∈∆(d, qi,d). On the other side, a universal tree
automaton (UTA, for short) is a special case of ATA in which all the Boolean combinations that
appear in δ are conjunctions of moves. Thus, we have that δ(q, σ) = ∧i(di, qi), for all states q ∈ Q
and symbols σ ∈ Σ.
The semantics of the ATAs is given through the following concept of run.
Definition 5.2 (ATA Run). A run of an ATA A = 〈Σ,∆,Q, δ, q0,ℵ〉 on a Σ-labeled ∆-tree
T = 〈T, v〉 is a (∆ × Q)-tree R such that, for all nodes x ∈ R, where x =
∏n
i=1(di, qi) and
y ,
∏n
i=1 di with n ∈ [0, ω[ , it holds that (i) y ∈ T and (ii), there is a set of moves S ⊆ ∆ × Q
with S |= δ(qn, v(y)) such that x · (d, q) ∈ R, for all (d, q) ∈ S.
In the following, we consider ATAs along with the parity acceptance condition (APT, for short)
ℵ , (F1, . . . ,Fk) ∈ (2Q)+ with F1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Fk = Q (see [Kupferman et al. 2000], for more). The
number k of sets in the tuple ℵ is called the index of the automaton. We also consider ATAs with the
co-Büchi acceptance condition (ACT, for short) that is the special parity condition with index 2.
Let R be a run of an ATA A on a tree T and w one of its branches. Then, by inf(w) , {q ∈ Q
: |{i ∈ N : ∃d ∈ ∆.(w)i = (d, q)}| = ω} we denote the set of states that occur infinitely often as
the second component of the letters along the branch w. Moreover, we say that w satisfies the parity
acceptance condition ℵ=(F1, . . . ,Fk) if the least index i∈ [1, k] for which inf(w)∩Fi 6= ∅ is even.
At this point, we can define the concept of language accepted by an ATA.
Definition 5.3 (ATA Acceptance). An ATA A = 〈Σ,∆,Q, δ, q0,ℵ〉 accepts a Σ-labeled ∆-tree
T iff is there exists a run R of A on T such that all its infinite branches satisfy the acceptance
condition ℵ.
By L(A) we denote the language accepted by the ATA A, i.e., the set of trees T accepted by A.
Moreover, A is said to be empty if L(A) = ∅. The emptiness problem for A is to decide whether
L(A) = ∅.
We finally show a simple but useful result about the APT direction projection. To do this, we first
need to introduce an extra notation. Let f ∈ B(P) be a Boolean formula on a set of propositions
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P. Then, by f [p/q |p ∈ P′] we denote the formula in which all occurrences of the propositions
p ∈ P′ ⊆ P in f are replaced by the proposition q belonging to a possibly different set.
THEOREM 5.4 (APT DIRECTION PROJECTION). Let A , 〈Σ ×∆,∆,Q, δ, q0,ℵ〉 be an APT
over a set of m directions with n states and index k. Moreover, let d0 ∈ ∆ be a distinguished
direction. Then, there exists an NPT N d0 , 〈Σ,∆,Q′, δ′, q′0,ℵ′〉 with m · 2O(k·n·logn) states and
index O(k · n · logn) such that, for all Σ-labeled ∆-tree T , 〈T, v〉, it holds that T ∈ L(N d0) iff
T ′ ∈ L(A), where T ′ is the (Σ×∆)-labeled ∆-tree 〈T, v′〉 such that v′(t) , (v(t), lst(d0 · t)), for
all t ∈ T.
PROOF. As first step, we use the well-known nondeterminization procedure for
APTs [Muller and Schupp 1995] in order to transform the APT A into an equivalent NPT
N = 〈Σ × ∆,∆,Q′′, δ′′, q′′0 ,ℵ
′′〉 with 2O(k·n·logn) states and index k′ = O(k · n · logn). Then,
we transform the latter into the new NPT N d0 , 〈Σ,∆,Q′, δ′, q′0,ℵ′〉 with m · 2O(k·n·logn) states
and same index k′, where Q′ , Q′′ × ∆, q′0 , (q′′0 , d0), ℵ′ , (F1 × ∆, . . . ,Fk′ × ∆) with
ℵ′′ , (F1, . . . ,Fk′), and δ′((q, d), σ) , δ′′(q, (σ, d))[(d′, q′)/(d′, (q′, d′))|(d′, q′) ∈ ∆× Q′′], for
all (q, d) ∈ Q′ and σ ∈ Σ. Now, it easy to see that N d0 satisfies the declared statement.
5.2. SL Model Checking
A first step towards our construction of an algorithmic procedure for the solution of the SL model-
checking problem is to define, for each possible formula ϕ, an alternating parity tree automatonAGϕ
that recognizes a tree encoding T of a CGS G, containing the information on an assignment χ on the
free variables/agents of ϕ, iff G is a model of ϕ under χ. The high-level idea at the base of this con-
struction is an evolution and merging of those behind the translations of QPTL and LTL, respectively,
into nondeterministic [Sistla et al. 1987] and alternating [Muller et al. 1988] Büchi automata.
To proceed with the formal description of the model-checking procedure, we have to introduce a
concept of encoding for the assignments of a CGS.
Definition 5.5 (Assignment-State Encoding). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ StG one of its states, and
χ ∈ AsgG(V, s) an assignment defined on the set V ⊆ Var ∪ Ag. Then, a (ValAcG (V) × StG)-
labeled StG-tree T , 〈T, u〉, where T , {ρ≥1 : ρ ∈ TrkG(s)}, is an assignment-state encoding for
χ if it holds that u(t) , (χ̂(s · t), lst(s · t)), for all t ∈ T.
Observe that there is a unique assignment-state encoding for each given assignment.
In the next lemma, we prove the existence of an APT for each CGS and SL formula that is able to
recognize all the assignment-state encodings of an a priori given assignment, made the assumption
that the formula is satisfied on the CGS under this assignment.
LEMMA 5.6 (SL FORMULA AUTOMATON). Let G be a CGS and ϕ an SL formula. Then, there
exists an APT AGϕ , 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ))×StG , StG ,Qϕ, δϕ, q0ϕ,ℵϕ〉 such that, for all states s ∈ StG
and assignments χ ∈ AsgG(free(ϕ), s), it holds that G, χ, s |= ϕ iff T ∈ L(AGϕ), where T is the
assignment-state encoding for χ.
PROOF. The construction of the APT AGϕ is done recursively on the structure of the formula
ϕ, which w.l.o.g. is supposed to be in enf, by using a variation of the transformation, via alternat-
ing tree automata, of the S1S and SkS logics into nondeterministic Büchi word and tree automata
recognizing all models of the formula of interest [Büchi 1962; Rabin 1969].
The detailed construction of AGϕ, by a case analysis on ϕ, follows.
— If ϕ ∈ AP, the automaton has to verify if the atomic proposition is locally satisfied or not. To
do this, we set AGϕ , 〈ValAcG (∅) × StG , StG , {ϕ}, δϕ, ϕ, ({ϕ})〉, where δϕ(ϕ, (v, s)) , t, if
ϕ ∈ λG(s), and δϕ(ϕ, (v, s)) , f, otherwise. Intuitively, AGϕ only verifies that the state s in the
labeling of the root of the assignment-state encoding of the empty assignment ∅ satisfies ϕ.
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— The boolean case ϕ = ¬ϕ′ is treated in the classical way, by simply dualizing the automaton
AGϕ′ = 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ
′))× StG , StG ,Qϕ′ , δϕ′ , q0ϕ′ ,ℵϕ′〉 [Muller and Schupp 1987].
— The boolean cases ϕ = ϕ1Op ϕ2, with Op ∈ {∧,∨}, are treated in a way that is similar to
the classical one, by simply merging the two automata AGϕ1 = 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ1)) × StG , StG ,
Qϕ1 , δϕ1 , q0ϕ1 ,ℵϕ1〉 and AGϕ2 = 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ2)) × StG , StG ,Qϕ2 , δϕ2 , q0ϕ2 ,ℵϕ2〉 into the
automaton AGϕ , 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ))× StG , StG ,Qϕ, δϕ, q0ϕ,ℵϕ〉, where the following hold:
—Qϕ , {q0ϕ} ∪Qϕ1 ∪Qϕ2 , with q0ϕ 6∈ Qϕ1 ∪Qϕ2;
— δϕ(q0ϕ, (v, s)) , δϕ1(q0ϕ1 , (v↾free(ϕ1), s)) Op δϕ2(q0ϕ2 , (v↾free(ϕ2), s)), for all (v, s) ∈
ValAcG (free(ϕ)) × StG ;
— δϕ(q, (v, s)) , δϕ1(q, (v↾free(ϕ1), s)), if q ∈ Qϕ1 , and δϕ(q, (v, s)) , δϕ2(q, (v↾free(ϕ2), s)),
otherwise, for all q ∈ Qϕ1 ∪Qϕ2 and (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(ϕ))× StG ;
— ℵϕ , (F1ϕ, . . . ,Fkϕ), where (i) ℵϕ1 , (F1ϕ1 , . . . ,Fk1ϕ1) and ℵϕ2 , (F1ϕ2 , . . . ,Fk2ϕ2),
(ii) h = min{k1, k2} and k = max{k1, k2}, (iii) Fiϕ , Fiϕ1 ∪ Fiϕ2 , for i ∈ [1, h], (iv)
Fiϕ , Fiϕj , for i ∈ [h+ 1, k − 1] with kj = k, and (v) Fkϕ , Qϕ.
— The case ϕ = X ϕ′ is solved by running the automatonAGϕ′ = 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ′))×StG , StG ,Qϕ′ ,
δϕ′ , q0ϕ′ ,ℵϕ′〉 on the successor node of the root of the assignment-state encoding in the direction
individuated by the assignment itself. To do this, we use the automatonAGϕ , 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ))×
StG , StG ,Qϕ, δϕ, q0ϕ,ℵϕ〉, where the following hold:
—Qϕ , {q0ϕ} ∪Qϕ′ , with q0ϕ 6∈ Qϕ′ ;
— δϕ(q0ϕ, (v, s)) , (τG(s, v↾Ag), q0ϕ′), for all (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(ϕ)) × StG ;
— δϕ(q, (v, s)) , δϕ′(q, (v↾free(ϕ′), s)), for all q ∈ Qϕ′ and (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(ϕ))× StG ;
— ℵϕ , (F1ϕ′ , . . . ,Fkϕ′ ∪ {q0ϕ}), where ℵϕ′ , (F1ϕ′ , . . . ,Fkϕ′).
— To handle the case ϕ = ϕ1U ϕ2, we use the automaton AGϕ , 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ)) ×
StG , StG ,Qϕ, δϕ, q0ϕ,ℵϕ〉 that verifies the truth of the until operator using its one-step
unfolding equivalence ϕ1U ϕ2 ≡ ϕ2 ∨ ϕ1 ∧ X ϕ1U ϕ2, by appropriately running the
two automata AGϕ1 = 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ1)) × StG , StG ,Qϕ1 , δϕ1 , q0ϕ1 ,ℵϕ1〉 and A
G
ϕ2
=
〈ValAcG (free(ϕ2)) × StG , StG ,Qϕ2 , δϕ2 , q0ϕ2 ,ℵϕ2〉 for the inner formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2.
The definitions of AGϕ components follows:
—Qϕ , {q0ϕ} ∪Qϕ1 ∪Qϕ2 , with q0ϕ 6∈ Qϕ1 ∪Qϕ2;
— δϕ(q0ϕ, (v, s)) , δϕ2(q0ϕ2 , (v↾free(ϕ2), s)) ∨ δϕ1(q0ϕ1 , (v↾free(ϕ1), s)) ∧ (τG(s, v↾Ag), q0ϕ), for
all (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(ϕ)) × StG ;
— δϕ(q, (v, s)) , δϕ1(q, (v↾free(ϕ1), s)), if q ∈ Qϕ1 , and δϕ(q, (v, s)) , δϕ2(q, (v↾free(ϕ2), s)),
otherwise, for all q ∈ Qϕ1 ∪Qϕ2 and (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(ϕ))× StG ;
— ℵϕ , (F1ϕ, . . . ,Fkϕ), where (i) ℵϕ1 , (F1ϕ1 , . . . ,Fk1ϕ1) and ℵϕ2 , (F1ϕ2 , . . . ,Fk2ϕ2), (ii)
h = min{k1, k2} and k = max{k1, k2}, (iii) Fiϕ , {q0ϕ} ∪ Fiϕ1 ∪ Fiϕ2 , for i ∈ [1, h], (iv)
Fiϕ , {q0ϕ} ∪ Fiϕj , for i ∈ [h+ 1, k − 1] with kj = k, and (v) Fkϕ , Qϕ.
It is important to observe that the initial state q0ϕ is included in all sets of the parity acceptance
condition, in particular in F1ϕ, in order to avoid its regeneration for an infinite number of times.
— To handle the case ϕ = ϕ1R ϕ2, we use the automaton AGϕ , 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ)) ×
StG , StG ,Qϕ, δϕ, q0ϕ,ℵϕ〉 that verifies the truth of the release operator using its one-
step unfolding equivalence ϕ1R ϕ2 ≡ ϕ2 ∧ (ϕ1 ∨ X ϕ1R ϕ2), by appropriately run-
ning the two automata AGϕ1 = 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ1)) × StG , StG ,Qϕ1, δϕ1 , q0ϕ1 ,ℵϕ1〉 and
AGϕ2 = 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ2)) × StG , StG ,Qϕ2 , δϕ2 , q0ϕ2 ,ℵϕ2〉 for the inner formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2.
The definitions of AGϕ components follows:
—Qϕ , {q0ϕ} ∪Qϕ1 ∪Qϕ2 , with q0ϕ 6∈ Qϕ1 ∪Qϕ2;
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:32 Fabio Mogavero et al.
— δϕ(q0ϕ, (v, s)) , δϕ2(q0ϕ2 , (v↾free(ϕ2), s))∧(δϕ1 (q0ϕ1 , (v↾free(ϕ1), s))∨(τG (s, v↾Ag), q0ϕ)), for
all (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(ϕ))× StG ;
— δϕ(q, (v, s)) , δϕ1(q, (v↾free(ϕ1), s)), if q ∈ Qϕ1 , and δϕ(q, (v, s)) , δϕ2(q, (v↾free(ϕ2), s)),
otherwise, for all q ∈ Qϕ1 ∪Qϕ2 and (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(ϕ)) × StG ;
— ℵϕ , (F1ϕ, . . . ,Fkϕ), where (i) ℵϕ1 , (F1ϕ1 , . . . ,Fk1ϕ1) and ℵϕ2 , (F1ϕ2 , . . . ,Fk2ϕ2), (ii)
h = min{k1, k2} and k = max{k1, k2}, (iii) F1ϕ , F1ϕ1 ∪ F1ϕ2 , (iv) Fiϕ , {q0ϕ} ∪ Fiϕ1 ∪
Fiϕ2 , for i∈ [2, h], (iv) Fiϕ,{q0ϕ}∪Fiϕj , for i∈ [h+1, k− 1] with kj=k, and (v) Fkϕ,Qϕ.
It is important to observe that, differently from the case of the until operator, the initial state q0ϕ
is included in all sets of the parity acceptance condition but F1ϕ, in order to allow its regeneration
for an infinite number of time.
— The case ϕ = (a, x)ϕ′ is solved by simply transforming the transition function of the automaton
AGϕ′ = 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ
′)) × StG , StG ,Qϕ′ , δϕ′ , q0ϕ′ ,ℵϕ′〉, by setting the value of the valuations
in input w.r.t. the agent a to the value of the same valuation w.r.t. the variable x. The definitions
of the transition function for AGϕ , 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ)) × StG , StG ,Qϕ′ , δϕ, q0ϕ′ ,ℵϕ′〉 follows:
δϕ(q, (v, s)) , δϕ′(q, (v
′, s)), where v′ = v[a 7→ v(x)]↾free(ϕ′), if a ∈ free(ϕ′), and v′ = v,
otherwise, for all q ∈ Qϕ′ and (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(ϕ)) × StG .
— To handle the case ϕ = 〈〈x〉〉ϕ′, assuming that x ∈ free(ϕ′), we use the operation of existential
projection for nondeterministic tree automata. To do this, we have first to nondeterminize the APT
AGϕ′ , by applying the classic transformation [Muller and Schupp 1995]. In this way, we obtain an
equivalent NPT NGϕ′ = 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ′))×StG , StG ,Qϕ′ , δϕ′ , q0ϕ′ ,ℵϕ′〉. Now, we make the pro-
jection, by defining the new NPT AGϕ , 〈ValAcG (free(ϕ)) × StG , StG ,Qϕ′, δϕ, q0ϕ′ ,ℵϕ′〉 where
δϕ(q, (v, s)) ,
∨
c∈AcG
δϕ′(q, (v[x 7→ c], s)), for all q ∈ Qϕ′ and (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(ϕ))×StG .
At this point, it only remains to prove that, for all states s ∈ StG and assignments χ ∈
AsgG(free(ϕ), s), it holds that G, χ, s |= ϕ iff T ∈ L(AGϕ), where T is the assignment-state en-
coding for χ. The proof can be developed by a simple induction on the structure of the formula ϕ
and is left to the reader as a simple exercise.
We now have the tools to describe the recursive model-checking procedure on nested subsen-
tences for SL and its fragments under the general semantics.
To proceed, we have first to prove the following theorem that represents the core of our automata-
theoretic approach.
THEOREM 5.7 (SL SENTENCE AUTOMATON). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ StG one of its states, and
ϕ an SL sentence. Then, there exists an NPT NG,sϕ such that G,∅, s |= ϕ iff L(NG,sϕ ) 6= ∅.
PROOF. To construct the NPT NG,sϕ we apply Theorem 5.4 of APT direction projection with
distinguished direction s to the APT AGϕ derived by Lemma 5.6 of SL formula automaton. In this
way, we can ensure that the state labeling of nodes of the assignment-state encoding is coherent with
the node itself. Observe that, since ϕ is a sentence, we have that free(ϕ) = ∅, and so, the unique
assignment-state encoding of interest is that related to the empty assignment ∅.
[Only if]. Suppose that G,∅, s |= ϕ. Then, by Lemma 5.6, we have that T ∈ L(AGϕ), where T is
the elementary dependence-state encoding for ∅. Hence, by Theorem 5.4, it holds that L(NG,sϕ ) 6=
∅.
[If]. Suppose that L(NG,sϕ ) 6= ∅. Then, by Theorem 5.4, there exists an ({∅}×StG)-labeled StG-
tree T such that T ∈ L(AGϕ). Now, it is immediate to see that T is the assignment-state encoding
for ∅. Hence, by Lemma 5.6, we have that G,∅, s |= ϕ.
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Before continuing, we define the length lng(ϕ) of an SL formula ϕ as the number |sub(ϕ)| of its
subformulas. We also introduce a generalization of the Knuth’s double arrow notation in order to
represents a tower of exponentials: a ↑↑b 0 , b and a ↑↑b (c+ 1) , aa↑↑bc, for all a, b, c ∈ N.
At this point, we prove the main theorem about the non-elementary complexity of SL model-
checking problem.
THEOREM 5.8 (SL MODEL CHECKING). The model-checking problem for SL is PTIME-
COMPLETE w.r.t. the size of the model and NONELEMENTARYTIME w.r.t. the size of the specifi-
cation.
PROOF. By Theorem 5.7 of SL sentence automaton, to verify that G,∅, s |= ϕ, we simply
calculate the emptiness of the NPT NG,sϕ having |StG | · (2 ↑↑m m) states and index 2 ↑↑m m,
where m = O(lng(ϕ) · log lng(ϕ)). It is well-known that the emptiness problem for such a kind
of automaton with n states and index h is solvable in time O(nh) [Kupferman and Vardi 1998].
Thus, we get that the time complexity of checking whether G,∅, s |= ϕ is |StG |2↑↑mm. Hence,
the membership of the model-checking problem for SL in PTIME w.r.t. the size of the model and
NONELEMENTARYTIME w.r.t. the size of the specification directly follows. Finally, by getting the
relative lower bound on the model from the same problem for ATL∗ [Alur et al. 2002], the thesis is
proved.
Finally, we show a refinement of the previous result, when we consider sentences of the SL[NG]
fragment.
THEOREM 5.9 (SL[NG] MODEL CHECKING). The model-checking problem for SL[NG] is
PTIME-COMPLETE w.r.t. the size of the model and (k+1)-EXPTIME w.r.t. the maximum alternation
k of the specification.
PROOF. By Theorem 5.7 of SL sentence automaton, to verify that G,∅, s |= ℘ψ, where ℘ψ is an
SL[NG] principal sentence without proper subsentences, we can simply calculate the emptiness of
the NPT NG,s℘ψ having |StG | · (2 ↑↑m k) states and index 2 ↑↑m k, where m = O(lng(ψ) · log lng(ψ))
and k = alt(℘ψ). Thus, we get that the time complexity of checking whether G,∅, s |= ℘ψ is
|StG |2↑↑mk. At this point, since we have to do this verification for each possible state s ∈ StG
and principal subsentence ℘ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ) of the whole SL[NG] specification ϕ, we derive that
the bottom-up model-checking procedure requires time |StG |2↑↑lng(ϕ)k, where k = max{alt(℘ψ)
: ℘ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ)}. Hence, the membership of the model-checking problem for SL in PTIME w.r.t.
the size of the model and (k + 1)-EXPTIME w.r.t. the maximum alternation k of the specifica-
tion directly follows. Finally, by getting the relative lower bound on the model from the same
problem for ATL∗ [Alur et al. 2002], the thesis is proved.
5.3. SL[1G] Model Checking
We now show how the concept of elementariness of dependence maps over strategies can be used to
enormously reduce the complexity of the model-checking procedure for the SL[1G] fragment. The
idea behind our approach is to avoid the use of projections used to handle the strategy quantifications,
by reducing them to action quantifications, which can be managed locally on each state of the model
without a tower of exponential blow-ups.
To start with the description of the ad-hoc procedure for SL[1G], we first
prove the existence of a UCT for each CGS and SL[1G] goal ♭ψ that rec-
ognizes all the assignment-state encodings of an a priori given assignment,
made the assumption that the goal is satisfied on the CGS under this assignment.
LEMMA 5.10 (SL[1G] GOAL AUTOMATON). Let G be a CGS and ♭ψ an SL[1G] goal without
principal subsentences. Then, there exists an UCT UG♭ψ , 〈ValAcG (free(♭ψ)) × StG , StG ,Q♭ψ, δ♭ψ,
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q♭ψ,ℵ♭ψ〉 such that, for all states s ∈ StG and assignments χ ∈ AsgG(free(♭ψ), s), it holds that
G, χ, s |= ♭ψ iff T ∈ L(UG♭ψ), where T is the assignment-state encoding for χ.
PROOF. A first step in the construction of the UCT UG♭ψ is to consider the UCW Uψ , 〈2
AP,Qψ,
δψ,Q0ψ,ℵψ〉 obtained by dualizing the NBW resulting from the application of the classic Vardi-
Wolper construction to the LTL formula ¬ψ [Vardi and Wolper 1986]. Observe that L(Uψ) = L(ψ),
i.e., Uψ recognizes all infinite words on the alphabet 2AP that satisfy the LTL formula ψ. Then,
define the components of UG♭ψ , 〈ValAcG (free(♭ψ))× StG , StG ,Q♭ψ, δ♭ψ, q0♭ψ,ℵ♭ψ〉 as follows:
—Q♭ψ , {q0♭ψ} ∪Qψ, with q0♭ψ 6∈ Qψ;
— δ♭ψ(q0♭ψ, (v, s)) ,
∧
q∈Q0ψ
δ♭ψ(q, (v, s)), for all (v, s) ∈ ValAcG (free(♭ψ)) × StG ;
— δ♭ψ(q, (v, s)),
∧
q′∈δψ(q,λG(s))
(τG(s, v ◦ ζ♭), q
′), for all q ∈Qψ and (v, s) ∈ValAcG (free(♭ψ)) ×
StG ;
— ℵ♭ψ , ℵψ.
Intuitively, the UCT UG♭ψ simply runs the UCW Uψ on the branch of the encoding individuated
by the assignment in input. Thus, it is easy to see that, for all states s ∈ StG and assignments
χ ∈ AsgG(free(♭ψ), s), it holds that G, χ, s |= ♭ψ iff T ∈ L(UG♭ψ), where T is the assignment-state
encoding for χ.
Now, to describe our modified technique, we introduce a new concept of encoding regarding the
elementary dependence maps over strategies.
Definition 5.11 (Elementary Dependence-State Encoding). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ StG one of its
states, and θ ∈ EDMStrG(s)(℘) an elementary dependence map over strategies for a quantification
prefix ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) over the set V ⊆ Var. Then, a (DMAcG (℘) × StG)-labeled StG-tree T , 〈T,
u〉, where T , {ρ≥1 : ρ ∈ TrkG(s)}, is an elementary dependence-state encoding for θ if it holds
that u(t) , (θ˜(s · t), lst(s · t)), for all t ∈ T.
Observe that there exists a unique elementary dependence-state encoding for each elementary de-
pendence map over strategies.
In the next lemma, we show how to handle locally the strategy quantifications on each state
of the model, by simply using a quantification over actions, which is modeled by the choice of an
action dependence map. Intuitively, we guess in the labeling what is the right part of the dependence
map over strategies for each node of the tree and then verify that, for all assignments of universal
variables, the corresponding complete assignment satisfies the inner formula.
LEMMA 5.12 (SL[1G] SENTENCE AUTOMATON). Let G be a CGS and ℘♭ψ an SL[1G] princi-
pal sentence without principal subsentences. Then, there exists a UCT UG℘♭ψ , 〈DMAcG (℘)× StG ,
StG ,Q℘♭ψ, δ℘♭ψ, q0℘♭ψ,ℵ℘♭ψ〉 such that, for all states s ∈ StG and elementary dependence maps
over strategies θ ∈ EDMStrG(s)(℘), it holds that G, θ(χ), s |=E ♭ψ, for all χ ∈ AsgG([[℘]], s), iff
T ∈ L(UG
℘♭ψ
), where T is the elementary dependence-state encoding for θ.
PROOF. By Lemma 5.10 of SL[1G] goal automaton, there is an UCT UG♭ψ = 〈ValAcG (free(♭ψ))×
StG , StG ,Q♭ψ, δ♭ψ, q0♭ψ,ℵ♭ψ〉 such that, for all states s ∈ StG and assignments χ ∈
AsgG(free(♭ψ), s), it holds that G, χ, s |= ♭ψ iff T ∈ L(UG♭ψ), where T is the assignment-state
encoding for χ.
Now, transform UG♭ψ into the new UCT U
G
℘♭ψ , 〈DMAcG (℘) × StG , StG ,Q℘♭ψ, δ℘♭ψ, q0℘♭ψ,
ℵ℘♭ψ〉, with Q℘♭ψ , Q♭ψ, q0℘♭ψ , q0♭ψ , and ℵ℘♭ψ , ℵ♭ψ, which is used to handle the quan-
tification prefix ℘ atomically, where the transition function is defined as follows: δ℘♭ψ(q, (θ, s)) ,
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∧
v∈ValAcG ([[℘]])
δ♭ψ(q, (θ(v), s)), for all q ∈ Q℘♭ψ and (θ, s) ∈ DMAcG (℘)× StG . Intuitively, UG℘♭ψ
reads an action dependence map θ on each node of the input tree T labeled with a state s of G and
simulates the execution of the transition function δ♭ψ(q, (v, s)) of UG♭ψ, for each possible valuation
v = θ(v′) on free(♭ψ) obtained from θ by a universal valuation v′ ∈ ValAcG ([[℘]]). It is important
to observe that we cannot move the component set DMAcG (℘) from the input alphabet to the states
of UG℘♭ψ , by making a related guessing of the dependence map θ in the transition function, since we
have to ensure that all states in a given node of the tree T , i.e., in each track of the original model
G, make the same choice for θ.
Finally, it remains to prove that, for all states s ∈ StG and elementary dependence map over
strategies θ ∈ EDMStrG(s)(℘), it holds that G, θ(χ), s |=E ♭ψ, for all χ ∈ AsgG([[℘]], s), iff T ∈
L(UG℘♭ψ), where T is the elementary dependence-state encoding for θ.
[Only if]. Suppose that G, θ(χ), s |=E ♭ψ, for all χ ∈ AsgG([[℘]], s). Since ψ does not contain
principal subsentences, we have that G, θ(χ), s |= ♭ψ. So, due to the property of UG♭ψ, it follows
that there exists an assignment-state encoding Tχ ∈ L(UG♭ψ), which implies the existence of an
(StG×Q♭ψ)-treeRχ that is an accepting run for UG♭ψ on Tχ. At this point, letR ,
⋃
χ∈AsgG([[℘]],s)
Rχ
be the union of all runs. Then, due to the particular definition of the transition function of UG
℘♭ψ
, it
is not hard to see that R is an accepting run for UG℘♭ψ on T . Hence, T ∈ L(U
G
℘♭ψ).
[If]. Suppose that T ∈ L(UG℘♭ψ). Then, there exists an (StG×Q℘♭ψ)-treeR that is an accepting run
for UG℘♭ψ on T . Now, for each χ ∈ AsgG([[℘]], s), let Rχ be the run for U
G
♭ψ on the assignment-state
encoding Tχ for θ(χ). Due to the particular definition of the transition function of UG℘♭ψ, it is easy to
see that Rχ ⊆ R. Thus, sinceR is accepting, we have thatRχ is accepting as well. So, Tχ ∈ L(UG♭ψ).
At this point, due to the property of UG
♭ψ
, it follows that G, θ(χ), s |= ♭ψ. Now, since ψ does not
contain principal subsentences, we have that G, θ(χ), s |=E ♭ψ, for all χ ∈ AsgG([[℘]], s).
At this point, we can prove the following theorem that is at the base of the elementary model-
checking procedure for SL[1G].
THEOREM 5.13 (SL[1G] SENTENCE AUTOMATON). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ StG one of its states,
and ℘♭ψ an SL[1G] principal sentence without principal subsentences. Then, there exists an NPT
NG,s℘♭ψ such that G,∅, s |= ℘♭ψ iff L(NG,s℘♭ψ) 6= ∅.
PROOF. As in the general case of SL sentence automaton, we have to ensure that the state label-
ing of nodes of the elementary dependence-state encoding is coherent with the node itself. To do
this, we apply Theorem 5.4 of APT direction projection with distinguished direction s to the UPT
UG
℘♭ψ
derived by Lemma 5.12 of the SL[1G] sentence automaton, thus obtaining the required NPT
NG,s℘♭ψ.
[Only if]. Suppose that G,∅, s |= ℘♭ψ. By Corollary 4.25 of SL[1G] elementariness, it means that
G,∅, s |=E ℘♭ψ. Then, by Definition 4.11 of SL[NG] elementary semantics, there exists an elemen-
tary dependence map θ ∈ EDMStrG(s)(℘) such that G, θ(χ), s |=E ♭ψ, for all χ ∈ AsgG([[℘]], s).
Thus, by Lemma 5.12, we have that T ∈ L(UG
℘♭ψ
), where T is the elementary dependence-state
encoding for θ. Hence, by Theorem 5.4, it holds that L(NG,s℘♭ψ) 6= ∅.
[If]. Suppose that L(NG,s
℘♭ψ
) 6= ∅. Then, by Theorem 5.4, there exists an (DMAcG (℘) × StG)-
labeled StG-tree T such that T ∈ L(UG℘♭ψ). Now, it is immediate to see that there is an elementary
dependence map θ ∈ EDMStrG(s)(℘) for which T is the elementary dependence-state encoding.
Thus, by Lemma 5.12, we have that G, θ(χ), s |=E ♭ψ, for all χ ∈ AsgG([[℘]], s). By Definition 4.11
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of SL[NG] elementary semantics, it holds that G,∅, s |=E ℘♭ψ. Hence, by Corollary 4.25 of SL[1G]
elementariness, it means that G,∅, s |= ℘♭ψ.
Finally, we show in the next fundamental theorem the precise complexity of the model-checking
for SL[1G].
THEOREM 5.14 (SL[1G] MODEL CHECKING). The model-checking problem for SL[1G] is
PTIME-COMPLETE w.r.t. the size of the model and 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE w.r.t. the size of the
specification.
PROOF. By Theorem 5.13 of SL[1G] sentence automaton, to verify that G,∅, s |= ℘♭ψ, we
simply calculate the emptiness of the NPT NG,s
℘♭ψ
. This automaton is obtained by the operation of
direction projection on the UCT UG
℘♭ψ
, which is in turn derived by the UCT UG
♭ψ
. Now, it is easy
to see that the number of states of UG♭ψ, and consequently of U
G
℘♭ψ, is 2
O(lng(ψ))
. So, NG,s℘♭ψ has
|StG | · 22
O(lng(ψ))
states and index 2O(lng(ψ)).
The emptiness problem for such a kind of automaton with n states and index h is solvable in time
O(nh) [Kupferman and Vardi 1998]. Thus, we get that the time complexity of checking whether
G,∅, s |= ℘♭ψ is |StG |2
O(lng(ψ))
. At this point, since we have to do this verification for each possible
state s ∈ StG and principal subsentence ℘♭ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ) of the whole SL[1G] specification ϕ, we
derive that the whole bottom-up model-checking procedure requires time |StG |2
O(lng(ϕ))
. Hence, the
membership of the model-checking problem for SL[1G] in PTIME w.r.t. the size of the model and
2EXPTIME w.r.t. the size of the specification directly follows. Finally the thesis is proved, by getting
the relative lower bounds from the same problem for ATL∗ [Alur et al. 2002].
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced and studied SL as a very powerful logic formalism to reasoning about
strategic behaviors of multi-agent concurrent games. In particular, we proved that it subsumes the
classical temporal and game logics not using explicit fix-points. As one of the main results about
SL, we shown that the relative model-checking problem is decidable but non-elementary hard. As
further and interesting practical results, we investigated several of its syntactic fragments. The most
appealing one is SL[1G], which is obtained by restricting SL to deal with one temporal goal at a
time. Interestingly, SL[1G] strictly extends ATL∗, while maintaining all its positive properties. In
fact, the model-checking problem is 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE, hence not harder than the one for
ATL∗. Moreover, although for the sake of space it is not reported in this paper, we shown that it
is invariant under bisimulation and decision-unwinding, and consequently, it has the decision-tree
model property. The main reason why SL[1G] has all these positive properties is that it satisfies a
special model property, which we name “elementariness”. Informally, this property asserts that all
strategy quantifications in a sentence can be reduced to a set of quantifications over actions, which
turn out to be easier to handle. We remark that among all SL fragments we investigated, SL[1G]
is the only one that satisfies this property. As far as we know, SL[1G] is the first significant proper
extension of ATL∗ having an elementary model-checking problem, and even more, with the same
computational complexity. All these positive aspects make us strongly believe that SL[1G] is a valid
alternative to ATL∗ to be used in the field of formal verification for multi-agent concurrent systems.
As another interesting fragment we investigated in this paper, we recall SL[BG]. This logic al-
lows us to express important game-theoretic properties, such as Nash equilibrium, which cannot be
defined in SL[1G]. Unfortunately, we do not have an elementary model-checking procedure for it,
neither we can exclude it. We leave to investigate this as future work.
Last but not least, from a theoretical point of view, we are convinced that our framework can
be used as a unifying basis for logic reasonings about strategic behaviors in multi-agent scenarios
and their relationships. In particular, it can be used to study variations and extensions of SL[1G]
in a way similar as it has been done in the literature for ATL∗. For example, it could be interest-
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ing to investigate memoryful SL[1G], by inheriting and extending the “memoryful” concept used
for ATL∗ and CHP-SL and investigated in [Mogavero et al. 2010b] and [Fisman et al. 2010], respec-
tively. Also, we recall that this concept implicitly allows to deal with backwards temporal modali-
ties. As another example, it would be interesting to investigate the graded extension of SL[1G], in
a way similar as it has been done in [Bianco et al. 2009; Bianco et al. 2010; Bianco et al. 2012]
and [Kupferman et al. 2002; Bonatti et al. 2008] for CTL and µCALCULUS, respectively. We re-
call that graded quantifiers in branching-time temporal logics allow to count how many equivalent
classes of paths satisfy a given property. This concept in SL[1G] would further allow the count-
ing of strategies and so to succinctly check the existence of more than one nonequivalent winning
strategy for a given agent, in one shot. We hope to lift to graded SL[1G] questions left open about
graded branching-time temporal logic, such as the precise satisfiability complexity of graded full
computation tree logic [Bianco et al. 2012].
A. MATHEMATICAL NOTATION
In this short reference appendix, we report the classical mathematical notation and some common
definitions that are used along the whole work.
Classic objects. We consider N as the set of natural numbers and [m,n] , {k ∈ N : m ≤ k ≤
n}, [m,n[ , {k ∈ N : m ≤ k < n}, ]m,n] , {k ∈ N : m < k ≤ n}, and ]m,n[ , {k ∈ N :
m < k < n} as its interval subsets, with m ∈ N and n ∈ N̂ , N ∪ {ω}, where ω is the numerable
infinity, i.e., the least infinite ordinal. Given a set X of objects, we denote by |X| ∈ N̂ ∪ {∞}
the cardinality of X, i.e., the number of its elements, where ∞ represents a more than countable
cardinality, and by 2X , {Y : Y ⊆ X} the powerset of X, i.e., the set of all its subsets.
Relations. By R ⊆ X×Y we denote a relation between the domain dom(R) , X and codomain
cod(R) , Y, whose range is indicated by rng(R) , {y ∈ Y : ∃x ∈ X. (x, y) ∈ R}. We use
R−1 , {(y, x) ∈ Y × X : (x, y) ∈ R} to represent the inverse of R itself. Moreover, by S ◦ R,
with R ⊆ X × Y and S ⊆ Y × Z, we denote the composition of R with S , i.e., the relation
S ◦ R , {(x, z) ∈ X× Z : ∃y ∈ Y. (x, y) ∈ R ∧ (y, z) ∈ S}. We also use Rn , Rn−1 ◦ R, with
n ∈ [1, ω[, to indicate the n-iteration of R ⊆ X× Y, where Y ⊆ X and R0 , {(y, y) : y ∈ Y} is
the identity on Y. With R+ ,
⋃<ω
n=1R
n and R∗ , R+ ∪R0 we denote, respectively, the transitive
and reflexive-transitive closure of R. Finally, for an equivalence relation R ⊆ X × X on X, we
represent with (X/R) , {[x]R : x ∈ X}, where [x]R , {x′ ∈ X : (x, x′) ∈ R}, the quotient set of
X w.r.t. R, i.e., the set of all related equivalence classes [·]R.
Functions. We use the symbol YX ⊆ 2X×Y to denote the set of total functions f from X to Y,
i.e., the relations f ⊆ X × Y such that for all x ∈ dom(f) there is exactly one element y ∈ cod(f)
such that (x, y) ∈ f. Often, we write f : X → Y and f : X ⇀ Y to indicate, respectively, f ∈ YX
and f ∈
⋃
X′⊆XY
X′
. Regarding the latter, note that we consider f as a partial function from X to
Y, where dom(f) ⊆ X contains all and only the elements for which f is defined. Given a set Z, by
f↾Z , f ∩ (Z×Y) we denote the restriction of f to the set X ∩ Z, i.e., the function f↾Z : X∩ Z⇀ Y
such that, for all x ∈ dom(f) ∩ Z, it holds that f↾Z(x) = f(x). Moreover, with ∅ we indicate a
generic empty function, i.e., a function with empty domain. Note that X ∩ Z = ∅ implies f↾Z = ∅.
Finally, for two partial functions f, g : X⇀ Y, we use f ⋒ g and f ⋓ g to represent, respectively, the
union and intersection of these functions defined as follows: dom(f ⋒g) , dom(f)∪dom(g)\{x ∈
dom(f) ∩ dom(g) : f(x) 6= g(x)}, dom(f ⋓ g) , {x ∈ dom(f) ∩ dom(g) : f(x) = g(x)},
(f ⋒ g)(x) = f(x) for x ∈ dom(f ⋒ g) ∩ dom(f), (f ⋒ g)(x) = g(x) for x ∈ dom(f ⋒ g) ∩ dom(g),
and (f ⋓ g)(x) = f(x) for x ∈ dom(f ⋓ g).
Words. By Xn, with n ∈ N, we denote the set of all n-tuples of elements from X, by X∗ ,⋃<ω
n=0X
n the set of finite words on the alphabet X, by X+ , X∗ \ {ε} the set of non-empty words,
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and by Xω the set of infinite words, where, as usual, ε ∈ X∗ is the empty word. The length of a
word w ∈ X∞ , X∗ ∪ Xω is represented with |w| ∈ N̂. By (w)i we indicate the i-th letter of the
finite word w ∈ X+, with i ∈ [0, |w|[ . Furthermore, by fst(w) , (w)0 (resp., lst(w) , (w)|w|−1),
we denote the first (resp., last) letter of w. In addition, by (w)≤i (resp., (w)>i), we indicate the
prefix up to (resp., suffix after) the letter of index i of w, i.e., the finite word built by the first
i + 1 (resp., last |w| − i − 1) letters (w)0, . . . , (w)i (resp., (w)i+1, . . . , (w)|w|−1). We also set,
(w)<0 , ε, (w)<i , (w)≤i−1, (w)≥0 , w, and (w)≥i , (w)>i−1, for i ∈ [1, |w|[ . Mutatis
mutandis, the notations of i-th letter, first, prefix, and suffix apply to infinite words too. Finally, by
pfx(w1, w2) ∈ X∞ we denote the maximal common prefix of two different words w1, w2 ∈ X∞,
i.e., the finite word w ∈ X∗ for which there are two words w′1, w′2 ∈ X∞ such that w1 = w · w′1,
w2 = w · w′2, and fst(w′1) 6= fst(w′2). By convention, we set pfx(w,w) , w.
Trees. For a set ∆ of objects, called directions, a ∆-tree is a set T ⊆ ∆∗ closed under prefix, i.e.,
if t · d ∈ T, with d ∈ ∆, then also t ∈ T. We say that it is complete if it holds that t · d′ ∈ T
whenever t · d ∈ T, for all d′ < d, where < ⊆ ∆ ×∆ is an a priori fixed strict total order on the
set of directions that is clear from the context. Moreover, it is full if T = ∆∗. The elements of T are
called nodes and the empty word ε is the root of T. For every t ∈ T and d ∈ ∆, the node t ·d ∈ T is
a successor of t in T. The tree is b-bounded if the maximal number b of its successor nodes is finite,
i.e., b = maxt∈T |{t · d ∈ T : d ∈ ∆}| < ω. A branch of the tree is an infinite word w ∈ ∆ω such
that (w)≤i ∈ T, for all i ∈ N. For a finite set Σ of objects, called symbols, a Σ-labeled ∆-tree is a
quadruple 〈Σ,∆,T, v〉, where T is a ∆-tree and v : T → Σ is a labeling function. When ∆ and Σ
are clear from the context, we call 〈T, v〉 simply a (labeled) tree.
B. PROOFS OF SECTION ??
In this appendix, we report the proofs of lemmas needed to prove the elementariness of SL[1G].
Before this, we describe two relevant properties that link together dependence maps of a given
quantification prefix with those of the dual one. These properties report, in the dependence maps
framework, what is known to hold, in an equivalent way, for first and second order logic. In particu-
lar, they result to be two key points towards a complete understanding of the strategy quantifications
of our logic.
The first of these properties enlighten the fact that two arbitrary dual dependence maps θ and θ
always share a common valuation v. To better understand this concept, consider for instance the
functions θ1 and θ6 of the examples illustrated just after Definition 4.5 of dependence maps. Then,
it is easy to see that the valuation v ∈ ValD(V) with v(x) = v(y) = 1 and v(z) = 0 resides in both
the ranges of θ1 and θ6, i.e., v ∈ rng(θ1) ∩ rng(θ6).
LEMMA B.1 (DEPENDENCE INCIDENCE). Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification prefix over a
set of variablesV ⊆ Var and D a generic set. Moreover, let θ ∈ DMD(℘) and θ ∈ DMD(℘) be two
dependence maps. Then, there exists a valuation v ∈ ValD(V) such that v = θ(v↾[[℘]]) = θ(v↾[[℘]]).
PROOF. W.l.o.g., suppose that ℘ starts with an existential quantifier. If this is not the case, the
dual prefix ℘ necessarily satisfies the above requirement, so, we can simply shift our reasoning on
it.
The whole proof proceeds by induction on the alternation number alt(℘) of ℘. As base case, if
alt(℘) = 0, we define v , θ(∅), since [[℘]] = ∅. Obviously, it holds that v = θ(v↾[[℘]]) = θ(v↾[[℘]]),
due to the fact that v↾[[℘]] = ∅ and v↾[[℘]] = v. Now, as inductive case, suppose that the statement
is true for all prefixes ℘′ ∈ Qnt(V′) with alt(℘′) = n, where V′ ⊂ V. Then, we prove that it is
true for all prefixes ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) with alt(℘) = n + 1 too. To do this, we have to uniquely split
℘ = ℘′ · ℘′′ into the two prefixes ℘′ ∈ Qnt(V′) and ℘′′ ∈ Qnt(V \ V′) such that alt(℘′) = n and
alt(℘′′) = 0. At this point, the following two cases can arise.
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— If n is even, it is immediate to see that 〈〈℘′′〉〉 = ∅. So, consider the dependence maps θ′ ∈
DMD(℘
′) and θ′ ∈ DMD(℘′) such that θ′(v↾[[℘′]]) = θ(v)↾V′ and θ′(v) = θ(v)↾V′ , for all
valuations v ∈ ValD([[℘]]) and v ∈ ValD([[℘]]) = ValD([[℘′ ]]). By the inductive hypothesis, there
exists a valuation v′ ∈ ValD(V′) such that v′ = θ′(v′↾[[℘′]]) = θ′(v
′
↾[[℘′ ]]
). So, set v , θ(v′
↾[[℘]]).
— If n is odd, it is immediate to see that [[℘′′]] = ∅. So, consider the dependence maps θ′ ∈ DMD(℘′)
and θ′ ∈ DMD(℘′) such that θ′(v) = θ(v)↾V′ and θ′(v↾[[℘′ ]]) = θ(v)↾V′ , for all valuations
v ∈ ValD([[℘]]) = ValD([[℘′]]) and v ∈ ValD([[℘]]). By the inductive hypothesis, there exists a
valuation v′ ∈ ValD(V′) such that v′ = θ′(v′↾[[℘′ ]]) = θ′(v
′
↾[[℘′ ]]
). So, set v , θ(v′
↾[[℘]]).
Now, it is easy to see that in both cases the valuation v satisfies the thesis, i.e., v = θ(v↾[[℘]]) =
θ(v↾[[℘]]).
The second property we are going to prove describes the fact that, if all dependence maps θ of a
given prefix ℘, for a dependent specific universal valuation v, share a given property then there is a
dual dependence maps θ that has the same property, for all universal valuations v. To have a better
understanding of this idea, consider again the examples reported just after Definition 4.5 and let
P , {(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0)} ⊂ ValD(V), where the triple (l,m, n) stands for the valuation that assigns
l to x, m to y, and n to z. Then, it is easy to see that all ranges of the dependence maps θi for ℘
intersect P, i.e., for all i ∈ [0, 3], there is v ∈ ValD([[℘]]) such that θi(v) ∈ P. Moreover, consider
the dual dependence maps θ2 for ℘. Then, it is not hard to see that θ2(v) ∈ P, for all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]).
LEMMA B.2 (DEPENDENCE DUALIZATION). Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification prefix over
a set of variables V ⊆ Var, D a generic set, and P ⊆ ValD(V) a set of valuations of V over D.
Moreover, suppose that, for all dependence maps θ ∈ DMD(℘), there is a valuation v ∈ ValD([[℘]])
such that θ(v) ∈ P. Then, there exists a dependence map θ ∈ DMD(℘) such that, for all valuations
v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), it holds that θ(v) ∈ P.
PROOF. The proof easily proceeds by induction on the length of the prefix ℘. As base case, when
|℘| = 0, we have that DMD(℘) = DMD(℘) = {∅}, i.e., the only possible dependence maps is the
empty function, which means that the statement is vacuously verified. As inductive case, we have
to distinguish between two cases, as follows.
— ℘ = 〈〈x〉〉 · ℘′.
As first thing, note that [[℘]] = [[℘′]] and, for all elements e ∈ D, consider the projection Pe ,
{v′ ∈ ValD(V(℘′)) : v′[x 7→ e] ∈ P} of P on the variable x with value e.
Then, by hypothesis, we can derive that, for all e ∈ D and θ′ ∈ DMD(℘′), there exists v′ ∈
ValD([[℘
′]]) such that θ′(v′) ∈ Pe. Indeed, let e ∈ D and θ′ ∈ DMD(℘′), and build the function θ :
ValD([[℘]]) → ValD(V) given by θ(v′) , θ′(v′)[x 7→ e], for all v′ ∈ ValD([[℘]]) = ValD([[℘′]]).
It is immediate to see that θ ∈ DMD(℘). So, by the hypothesis, there is v′ ∈ ValD([[℘]]) such that
θ(v′) ∈ P, which implies θ′(v′)[x 7→ e] ∈ P, and so, θ′(v′) ∈ Pe.
Now, by the inductive hypothesis, for all elements e ∈ D, there exists θ′e ∈ DMD(℘′) such
that, for all v′ ∈ ValD([[℘′ ]]), it holds that θ′e(v′) ∈ Pe, i.e., θ′e(v′)[x 7→ e] ∈ P.
At this point, consider the function θ : ValD([[℘]]) → ValD(V) given by θ(v) ,
θ′v(x)(v↾[[℘′ ]])[x 7→ v(x)], for all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]). Then, it is possible to verify that θ ∈ DMD(℘).
Indeed, for each y ∈ [[℘]] and v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), we have that θ(v)(y) = θ′v(x)(v↾[[℘′ ]])[x 7→
v(x)](y). Now, if y = x then θ(v)(y) = v(y). Otherwise, since θ′v(x) is a dependence map, it
holds that θ(v)(y) = θ′v(x)(v↾[[℘′ ]])(y) = v↾[[℘′ ]](y) = v(y). So, Item 1 of Definition 4.5 of de-
pendence maps is verified. It only remains to prove Item 2. Let y ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 and v1 , v2 ∈ ValD([[℘]]),
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with v1 ↾Dep(℘,y) = v2 ↾Dep(℘,y). It is immediate to see that x ∈ Dep(℘, y), so, v1(x) = v2(x),
which implies that θ′v1 (x) = θ′v2 (x). At this point, again for the fact that θ′v(x) is a dependence
map, for each v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), we have that θ′v1 (x)(v1 ↾[[℘′ ]])(y) = θ′v2 (x)(v2 ↾[[℘′ ]])(y). Thus,
it holds that θ(v1)(y) = θ′v1 (x)(v1 ↾[[℘′ ]])[x 7→ v1(x)](y) = θ′v2 (x)(v2 ↾[[℘′ ]])[x 7→ v2(x)](y) =
θ(v2)(y).
Finally, it is enough to observe that, by construction, θ(v) ∈ P, for all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), since
θ′v(x)(v↾[[℘′ ]]) ∈ Pv(x). Thus, the thesis holds for this case.
— ℘ = [[x]] · ℘′.
We first show that there exists e ∈ D such that, for all θ′ ∈ DMD(℘′), there is v′ ∈ ValD([[℘′]])
for which θ′(v′) ∈ Pe holds, where the set Pe is defined as above.
To do this, suppose by contradiction that, for all e ∈ D, there is a θ′e ∈ DMD(℘′) such that,
for all v′ ∈ ValD([[℘′]]), it holds that θ′e(v′) 6∈ Pe. Also, consider the function θ : ValD([[℘]]) →
ValD(V) given by θ(v) , θ′v(x)(v↾[[℘′]])[x 7→ v(x)], for all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]). Then, is possible to
verify that θ ∈ DMD(℘). Indeed, for each y ∈ [[℘]] and v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), we have that θ(v)(y) =
θ′
v(x)(v↾[[℘′]])[x 7→ v(x)](y). Now, if y = x then θ(v)(y) = v(y). Otherwise, since θ′v(x) is a
dependence map, it holds that θ(v)(y) = θ′
v(x)(v↾[[℘′]])(y) = v↾[[℘′]](y) = v(y). So, Item 1 of
Definition 4.5 of dependence maps is verified. It only remains to prove Item 2. Let y ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 and
v1, v2 ∈ ValD([[℘]]), with v1↾Dep(℘,y) = v2↾Dep(℘,y). It is immediate to see that x ∈ Dep(℘, y),
so, v1(x) = v2(x), which implies that θ′v1(x) = θ
′
v2(x)
. At this point, again for the fact that θ′
v(x) is
a dependence map, for each v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), we have that θ′v1(x)(v1↾[[℘′]])(y) = θ
′
v2(x)
(v2↾[[℘′]])(y).
Thus, it holds that θ(v1)(y) = θ′v1(x)(v1↾[[℘′]])[x 7→ v1(x)](y) = θ
′
v2(x)
(v2↾[[℘′]])[x 7→ v2(x)](y) =
θ(v2)(y). Now, by the contradiction hypothesis, we have that θ(v) 6∈ P, for all v ∈ Val([[℘]]),
since θ′
v(x)(v↾[[℘′]]) 6∈ Pv(x), which is in evident contradiction with the hypothesis.
At this point, by the inductive hypothesis, there exists θ′ ∈ DMD(℘′) such that, for all v′ ∈
ValD([[℘′ ]]), it holds that θ′(v′) ∈ Pe, i.e., θ′(v′)[x 7→ e] ∈ P.
Finally, build the function θ : ValD([[℘]]) → ValD(V) given by θ(v) , θ′(v)[x 7→ e], for
all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]) = ValD([[℘′ ]]). It is immediate to see that θ ∈ DMD(℘). Moreover, for all
valuations v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), it holds that θ(v) ∈ P. Thus, the thesis holds for this case too.
Hence, we have done with the proof of the lemma.
At this point, we are able to give the proofs of Lemma 4.9 of adjoint dependence maps,
Lemma 4.21 of dependence-vs-valuation duality, and Lemma 4.23 of encasement characterization.
LEMMA B.3 (ADJOINT DEPENDENCE MAPS). Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification prefix over
a set of variablesV ⊆ Var,D andT two generic sets, and θ : ValT→D([[℘]])→ ValT→D(V) and θ˜ :
T→ (ValD([[℘]])→ ValD(V)) two functions such that θ˜ is the adjoint of θ. Then, θ ∈ DMT→D(℘)
iff, for all t ∈ T, it holds that θ˜(t) ∈ DMD(℘).
PROOF. To prove the statement, it is enough to show, separately, that Items 1 and 2 of Defini-
tion 4.5 of dependence maps hold for θ if the θ˜(t) satisfies the same items, for all t ∈ T, and vice
versa.
[Item 1, if]. Assume that θ˜(t) satisfies Item 1, for each t ∈ T, i.e., θ˜(t)(v)↾[[℘]] = v, for all
v ∈ ValD([[℘]]). Then, we have that θ˜(t)(ĝ(t)) = ĝ(t), so, θ˜(t)(ĝ(t))(x) = ĝ(t)(x), for all
g ∈ ValT→D([[℘]]) and x ∈ [[℘]]. By hypothesis, we have that θ(g)(x)(t) = θ˜(t)(ĝ(t))(x), thus
θ(g)(x)(t) = ĝ(t)(x) = g(x)(t), which means that θ(g)↾[[℘]] = g, for all g ∈ ValT→D([[℘]]).
[Item 1, only if]. Assume now that θ satisfies Item 1, i.e., θ(g)↾[[℘]] = g, for all g ∈ ValT→D([[℘]]).
Then, we have that θ(g)(x)(t) = g(x)(t), for all x ∈ [[℘]] and t ∈ T. By hypothesis, we have
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that θ˜(t)(ĝ(t))(x) = θ(g)(x)(t), so, θ˜(t)(ĝ(t))(x) = g(x)(t) = ĝ(t)(x), which means that
θ˜(t)(ĝ(t))↾[[℘]] = ĝ(t). Now, since for each v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), there is an g ∈ ValT→D([[℘]]) such
that ĝ(t) = v, we obtain that θ˜(t)(v)↾[[℘]] = v, for all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]) and t ∈ T.
[Item 2, if]. Assume that θ˜(t) satisfies Item 2, for each t ∈ T, i.e., θ˜(t)(v1)(x) = θ˜(t)(v2)(x),
for all v1, v2 ∈ ValD([[℘]]) and x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 such that v1↾Dep(℘,x) = v2↾Dep(℘,x). Then, we have
that θ˜(t)(ĝ1(t))(x) = θ˜(t)(ĝ2(t))(x), for all g1, g2 ∈ ValT→D([[℘]]) such that g1↾Dep(℘,x) =
g2↾Dep(℘,x). By hypothesis, we have that θ(g1)(x)(t) = θ˜(t)(ĝ1(t))(x) and θ˜(t)(ĝ2(t))(x) =
θ(g2)(x)(t), thus θ(g1)(x)(t) = θ(g2)(x)(t). Hence, θ(g1)(x) = θ(g2)(x), for all g1, g2 ∈
ValT→D([[℘]]) and x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 such that g1↾Dep(℘,x) = g2↾Dep(℘,x).
[Item 2, only if]. Assume that θ satisfies Item 2, i.e., θ(g1)(x) = θ(g2)(x), for all g1, g2 ∈
ValT→D([[℘]]) and x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 such that g1↾Dep(℘,x) = g2↾Dep(℘,x). Then, we have that θ(g1)(x)(t) =
θ(g2)(x)(t), for all t ∈ T. By hypothesis, we have that θ˜(t)(ĝ1(t))(x) = θ(g1)(x)(t) and
θ(g2)(x)(t) = θ˜(t)(ĝ2(t))(x), hence θ˜(t)(ĝ1(t))(x) = θ˜(t)(ĝ2(t))(x). Now, since for each
v1, v2 ∈ ValD([[℘]]), with v1↾Dep(℘,x) = v2↾Dep(℘,x), there are g1, g2 ∈ ValT→D([[℘]]) such
that ĝ1(t) = v1 and ĝ2(t) = v2, with g1↾Dep(℘,x) = g2↾Dep(℘,x), we obtain that θ˜(t)(v1)(x) =
θ˜(t)(v2)(x), for all v1, v2 ∈ ValD([[℘]]) and x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 such that v1↾Dep(℘,x) = v2↾Dep(℘,x).
LEMMA B.4 (DEPENDENCE-VS-VALUATION DUALITY). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St one of its
states, P ⊆ Pth(s) a set of paths, ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) a quantification prefix over a set of variables
V ⊆ Var, and ♭ ∈ Bnd(V) a binding. Then, player even wins the TPG H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭) iff player
odd wins the dual TPG H(G, s,Pth(s) \ P, ℘, ♭).
PROOF. Let A and A be, respectively, the two TPAs A(G, s, ℘, ♭) and A(G, s, ℘, ♭). It is easy
to observe that PoseA = PoseA = Trk(s). Moreover, it holds that PosoA = {ρ · (lst(ρ), θ) :
ρ ∈ Trk(s) ∧ θ ∈ DMAc(℘)} and PosoA = {ρ · (lst(ρ), θ) : ρ ∈ Trk(s) ∧ θ ∈ DMAc(℘)}. We
now prove, separately, the two directions of the statement.
[Only if]. Suppose that player even wins the TPG H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭). Then, there exists an even
scheme se ∈ ScheA such that, for all odd schemes so ∈ SchoA, it holds that mtcA(se, so) ∈ P. Now,
to prove that odd wins the dual TPG H(G, s,Pth(s) \ P, ℘, ♭), we have to show that there exists an
odd scheme so ∈ SchoA such that, for all even schemes se ∈ ScheA , it holds that mtcA(se , so) ∈ P.
To do this, let us first consider a function z : DMAc(℘) × DMAc(℘) → ValAc(V) such that
z(θ, θ) = θ(z(θ, θ)↾[[℘]]) = θ(z(θ, θ)↾[[℘]]), for all θ ∈ DMAc(℘) and θ ∈ DMAc(℘). The existence
of such a function is ensured by Lemma B.1 on the dependence incidence.
Now, define the odd scheme so ∈ SchoA in A as follows: so(ρ · (lst(ρ), θ)) , τ(lst(ρ), z(θ, θ) ◦
ζ♭), for all ρ ∈ Trk(s) and θ ∈ DMAc(℘), where θ ∈ DMAc(℘) is such that se(ρ) = (lst(ρ), θ).
Moreover, let se ∈ ScheA be a generic even scheme in A and consider the derived odd scheme
so ∈ SchoA in A defined as follows: so(ρ · (lst(ρ), θ)) , τ(lst(ρ), z(θ, θ) ◦ ζ♭), for all ρ ∈ Trk(s)
and θ ∈ DMAc(℘), where θ ∈ DMAc(℘) is such that se(ρ) = (lst(ρ), θ).
At this point, it remains only to prove that ̟ = ̟ , where ̟ , mtcA(se, so) and ̟ ,
mtcA(se , so). To do this, we proceed by induction on the prefixes of the matches, i.e., we show that
(̟)≤i = (̟)≤i, for all i ∈ N. The base case is immediate by definition of match, since we have that
(̟)≤0 = s = (̟)≤0. Now, as inductive case, suppose that (̟)≤i = (̟)≤i, for i ∈ N. By the defi-
nition of match, we have that (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i·se((̟)≤i)) and (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i·se((̟)≤i)).
Moreover, by the inductive hypothesis, it follows that so((̟)≤i · se((̟)≤i)) = so((̟)≤i ·
se((̟)≤i)). At this point, let θ ∈ DMAc(℘) and θ ∈ DMAc(℘) be two quantification dependence
maps such that se((̟)≤i) = ((̟)i, θ) and se((̟)≤i) = ((̟)i, θ). Consequently, by substitut-
ing the values of the even schemes se and se , it holds that (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ)) and
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(̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ)). Furthermore, by the definition of the odd schemes so and so , it
follows that so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ)) = τ((̟)i, z(θ, θ) ◦ ζ♭) = so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ)). Thus, we have
that (̟)i+1 = (̟)i+1, which implies (̟)≤i+1 = (̟)≤i+1.
[If]. Suppose that player odd wins the dual TPG H(G, s,Pth(s) \ P, ℘, ♭). Then, there exists an
odd scheme so ∈ SchoA such that, for all even schemes se ∈ ScheA , it holds that mtcA(se , so) ∈ P.
Now, to prove that even wins the TPG H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭), we have to show that there exists an even
scheme se ∈ ScheA such that, for all odd schemes so ∈ SchoA, it holds that mtcA(se, so) ∈ P.
To do this, let us first consider the two functions g : Trk(s) → 2ValAc(V) and h : Trk(s) → 2St
such that g(ρ) , {θ(v) : θ ∈ DMAc(℘)∧v ∈ ValAc([[℘]])∧so(ρ·(lst(ρ), θ)) = τ(lst(ρ), θ(v)◦ζ♭)}
and h(ρ) , {so(ρ · (lst(ρ), θ)) : θ ∈ DMAc(℘)}, for all ρ ∈ Trk(s). Now, it is easy to see that, for
each ρ ∈ Trk(s) and θ ∈ DMAc(℘), there is v ∈ ValAc([[℘]]) such that θ(v) ∈ g(ρ). Consequently,
by Lemma B.2 on dependence dualization, for all ρ ∈ Trk(s), there is θρ ∈ DMAc(℘) such that,
for each v ∈ ValAc([[℘]]), it holds that θρ(v) ∈ g(ρ), and so, τ(lst(ρ), θρ(v) ◦ ζ♭) ∈ h(ρ).
Now, define the even scheme se ∈ ScheA inA as follows: se(ρ) , (lst(ρ), θρ), for all ρ ∈ Trk(s).
Moreover, let so ∈ ScheA be a generic odd scheme in A and consider the derived even scheme
se ∈ ScheA inA defined as follows: se(ρ) , (lst(ρ), θρ), for all ρ ∈ Trk(s), where θρ ∈ DMAc(℘)
is such that so(ρ · (lst(ρ), θρ)) = so(ρ · (lst(ρ), θρ)). The existence of such a dependence map is
ensure by the previous membership of the successor of lst(ρ) in h(ρ).
At this point, it remains only to prove that ̟ = ̟ , where ̟ , mtcA(se, so) and ̟ ,
mtcA(se , so). To do this, we proceed by induction on the prefixes of the matches, i.e., we show
that (̟)≤i = (̟)≤i, for all i ∈ N. The base case is immediate by definition of match, since
we have that (̟)≤0 = s = (̟)≤0. Now, as inductive case, suppose that (̟)≤i = (̟)≤i,
for i ∈ N. By the definition of match, we have that (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · se((̟)≤i)) and
(̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · se((̟)≤i)). Moreover, by the inductive hypothesis, it follows that so((̟)≤i ·
se((̟)≤i)) = so((̟)≤i ·se((̟)≤i)). Now, by substituting the values of the even schemes se and se ,
we have that (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i ·((̟)i, θ(̟)≤i)) and (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i ·((̟)i, θ̟≤i)). At this
point, due to the choice of the dependence map θ(̟)≤i , it holds that so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ(̟)≤i)) =
so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ(̟)≤i)). Thus, we have that (̟)i+1 = (̟)i+1, which implies (̟)≤i+1 =
(̟)≤i+1.
LEMMA B.5 (ENCASEMENT CHARACTERIZATION). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St one of its states,
P ⊆ Pth(s) a set of paths, ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) a quantification prefix over a set of variables V ⊆ Var,
and ♭ ∈ Bnd(V) a binding. Then, the following hold:
(i) player even wins H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭) iff P is an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭;
(ii) if player odd wins H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭) then P is not an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭;
(iii) if P is a Borelian set and it is not an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭ then player odd wins
H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭).
PROOF. [Item i, only if]. Suppose that player even wins the TPG H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭). Then, there
exists an even scheme se ∈ Sche such that, for all odd schemes so ∈ Scho, it holds that mtc(se, so) ∈
P. Now, to prove the statement, we have to show that there exists an elementary dependence map
θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘) such that, for all assignments χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s), it holds that play(θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s) ∈
P.
To do this, consider the function w : Trk(s) → DMAc(℘) constituting the projection of
se on the second component of its codomain, i.e., for all ρ ∈ Trk(s), it holds that se(ρ) =
(lst(ρ),w(ρ)). By Lemma 4.9 on adjoint dependence maps, there exists an elementary dependence
map θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘) for which w is the adjoint, i.e., w = θ˜. Moreover, let χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s)
be a generic assignment and consider the derived odd scheme so ∈ Scho defined ad follows:
so(ρ · (lst(ρ), θ′)) = τ(lst(ρ), θ′(χ̂(ρ)) ◦ ζ♭), for all ρ ∈ Trk(s) and θ′ ∈ DMAc(℘).
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At this point, it remains only to prove that π = ̟, where π , play(θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s) and ̟ ,
mtc(se, so). To do this, we proceed by induction on the prefixes of both the play and the match, i.e.,
we show that (π)≤i = (̟)≤i, for all i ∈ N. The base case is immediate by definition, since we have
that (π)≤0 = s = (̟)≤0. Now, as inductive case, suppose that (π)≤i = (̟)≤i, for i ∈ N. On one
hand, by the definition of match, we have that (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i ·se((̟)≤i)), from which, by sub-
stituting the value of the even scheme se, we derive (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ˜((̟)≤i))). On the
other hand, by the definition of play, we have that (π)i+1 = τ((π)i, θ˜((π)≤i)(χ̂((π)≤i))◦ ζ♭), from
which, by using the definition of the odd scheme so, we derive (π)i+1 = so((π)≤i ·((π)i, θ˜((π)≤i))).
Then, by the inductive hypothesis, we have that (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ˜((̟)≤i))) =
so((π)≤i · ((π)i, θ˜((π)≤i))) = (π)i+1, which implies (̟)≤i+1 = (π)≤i+1.
[Item i, if]. Suppose that P is an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭. Then, there exists an elementary
dependence map θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘) such that, for all assignments χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s), it holds that
play(θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s) ∈ P. Now, to prove the statement, we have to show that there exists an even
scheme se ∈ Sche such that, for all odd schemes so ∈ Scho, it holds that mtc(se, so) ∈ P.
To do this, consider the even scheme se ∈ Sche defined as follows: se(ρ) , (lst(ρ), θ˜(ρ)), for
all ρ ∈ Trk(s). Observe that, by Lemma 4.9 on adjoint dependence maps, the definition is well-
formed. Moreover, let so ∈ Scho be a generic odd scheme and consider a derived assignment χ ∈
Asg([[℘]], s) satisfying the following property: χ̂(ρ) ∈ {v ∈ ValAc([[℘]]) : so(ρ · (lst(ρ), θ˜(ρ))) =
τ(lst(ρ), θ˜(v) ◦ ζ♭)}, for all ρ ∈ Trk(s).
At this point, it remains only to prove that π = ̟, where π , play(θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s) and ̟ ,
mtc(se, so). To do this, we proceed by induction on the prefixes of both the play and the match, i.e.,
we show that (π)≤i = (̟)≤i, for all i ∈ N. The base case is immediate by definition, since we
have that (π)≤0 = s = (̟)≤0. Now, as inductive case, suppose that (π)≤i = (̟)≤i, for i ∈ N. On
one hand, by the definition of match, we have that (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · se((̟)≤i)), from which,
by the definition of the even scheme se, we derive (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ˜((̟)≤i))). On the
other hand, by the definition of play, we have that (π)i+1 = τ((π)i, θ˜((π)≤i)(χ̂((π)≤i))◦ ζ♭), from
which, by the choice of the assignment χ, we derive (π)i+1 = so((π)≤i · ((π)i, θ˜((π)≤i))). Then,
by the inductive hypothesis, we have that (̟)i+1 = so((̟)≤i · ((̟)i, θ˜((̟)≤i))) = so((π)≤i ·
((π)i, θ˜((π)≤i))) = (π)i+1, which implies (̟)≤i+1 = (π)≤i+1.
[Item ii]. If player odd wins the TPG H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭), we have that player even does not win the
same game. Consequently, by Item i, it holds that P is not an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭.
[Item iii]. If P is not an encasement w.r.t. ℘ and ♭, by Item i, we have that player even does not
win the TPG H(G, s,P, ℘, ♭). Now, since P is Borelian, by the determinacy theorem [Martin 1975;
Martin 1985], it holds that player odd wins the same game.
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